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Abstract
There are winners and losers from international trade. Nonetheless, many
became discontented with the current situation surrounding the explicit com-
pensation schemes for losers. Why do we observe both a lack of compensation
in general and the existence of overcompensation for some groups of individ-
uals? When agents differ in their relative and absolute talents to undertake
different occupations, shifts in the terms of trade will worsen the best out-
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come available to some agents and improve the best outcome available to
others. Trade liberalization benefits some job-switchers as well as job-stayers,
and harms some job-stayers as well as job-switchers. As a result, when the
government cannot observe the agents’ unused traits, it is impossible to de-
sign a program that ensures Pareto improvement from trade liberalization
without making overcompensation to certain parts of the population. This
proposition, derived rigorously in a two-good general equilibrium model with
occupational choice, casts doubt on the effectiveness of existing forms of trade
adjustment assistance programs. Under the conditions studied, the govern-
ment faces a tradeoff between Pareto improvement and overcompensating a
group of job-switching individuals.
JEL Classification: F11, F13, F16, H21, J23, J24
Keywords: occupational choice, intersectoral labor mobility, gains from in-
ternational trade, adjustment assistance, compensation scheme
1. Introduction
One of the problems with free trade is we never compensate
the losers. We always say that there are more winners than
losers, and that’s true. But there are losers, and we’re not
helping them. [Clyde Prestowitz, President of the Economic
Strategy Institute.]?1?
When economists advocate free trade, the focus of their attention
tends to be on the gains in aggregate efficiency. It is widely known that
international trade will expand the set of feasible allocations faced by
an economy as a whole. Nonetheless, international economists are quick
to point out that trade liberalization almost always brings redistributive
?1? Los Angeles Times: Friday April 5, 2002. Part 3, Page 3, “President Pushes Law-
makers to Expand Trade Legislation: Bush seeks ‘fast-track’ authority. Democrats want
help for U.S. workers hurt by foreign competition.”
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consequences among individuals within the economy [See for example Ro-
drik (1997. p. 30)]. Thus, a change in terms of trade favors some groups
of individuals over other groups. [For the description of a classical exam-
ple, see Stolper and Samuelson (1941).] This is indeed an area where the
protectionists can have the upper hand over the free traders. Of course,
some economists would argue that compensation of the losers could take
care of the problem.?2?After all, we will have a larger pie to share, and
we can compensate losers in full even if we make all the beneficiaries from
trade happier than they are in autarky. In the real world, however, many
have grown discontented with the current compensation scheme.
While this section’s epigraph, by Clyde Prestowitz, implies that com-
pensation for losers is either absent or insufficient, a completely opposite
opinion appears in The Washington Post. It claims that the present
compensation scheme, in the form of the Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) program, is far too magnanimous, and could put a huge strain on
the federal budget. Taking it for granted that the expansion of the TAA
program would be approved by the Senate in exchange for the president’s
fast-track “trade promotion authority” bill, the Post goes on to note that
conservative critics are dismayed at the concessions they were
forced to make, and they are hoping that budget constraints
will prevent the establishment of a large new entitlement pro-
gram.
“Socialist governments all over the planet are trying to stop
doing this kind of thing, and now we’re doing it,” said Sen.
Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), referring to government largess for the
unemployed. “Having said that, I’m very much for the [trade]
bill. The $12 billion we’ll be spending over 10 years [on trade
?2? This is known as the compensation principle: This compensation criterion requires
only a “potential” Pareto improvement. The criterion does not ask whether the actual
compensation has taken place.
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adjustment assistance] is tribute we have to pay to get the
bill. . . . Is it robbery? Is it tribute? Yes.” . . .?3?
All of this reflects a growing sentiment among conservatives that pro-
tectionist compensation schemes, when and if they exist, tend to shell out
so much money that the society can actually end up overcompensating
(some of) the losers — a paradox that will be elucidated by the model
proposed in this paper. The model seeks to explain the difficulty of en-
suring Pareto gains from trade when individuals are heterogeneous and
can freely move between different sectors. It concludes that no govern-
ment can attain Pareto improvement unless it makes inefficiently larger
transfers than are actually necessary.
The paper proposes a model of occupational choice in which we cap-
ture the realistic aspects of difficulty of identifying gainers and losers
from trade by introducing agents who differ in their relative and ab-
solute talents to undertake different occupations. The model achieves
aggregate gains from trade even when individuals are allowed to switch
jobs (or equivalently we observe temporally displaced workers). In order
to effectively place the displaced individuals within a general equilib-
rium (full employment) framework, I assume that each individual faces
an occupational choice.?4? [Those interested in the issues of structural
unemployment and gains from trade may wish to refer to the paper by
Brecher and Choudhri (1994).]
Changes in terms of trade may boost the best outcome available to
?3? The Washington Post: Saturday August 03, 2002. Page E01, “Trade Bill To Help
Laid-Off Workers; Victims of Imports Win Added Benefits.” by Paul Blustein.
?4? A good justification of this full employment assumption (with occupational choice)
has been provided by Daniel T. Griswold, associate director of The Center for Trade
Policy Studies at The Cato Institute, a libertarian research group: “trade had little
long-term impact on the overall number of jobs, because the American economy tended
to create jobs in more sophisticated industries to replace those that are lost.” The New
York Times: Tuesday October 29, 2002. Page 11, “TRADE WINDS; Global Trade in
Elmwood Park: Familiar Saga With a Twist.”
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some agents, while worsening the best outcome for others. Some peo-
ple are stuck in their industry (job-stayers), while others may switch
their occupations (job-switchers) owing to a change in the economic en-
vironment. The distribution of fortune and misfortune spreads across
the whole population, affecting both job-stayers and job-switchers alike.
When we imagine the world of Heckscher-Ohlin or specific-factors trade
models, it is not difficult to identify gainers and losers from trade. For
such particular results within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, see Stolper
and Samuelson (1941). For the specific-factors model, see Jones (1971)
and Samuelson (1971). In the model with occupational choice, it turns
out to be very difficult to identify gainers or losers among those who
switch their occupations. As a result it is hard to design a redistribution
program that targets only those harmed by trade openings.
The primary reason for this difficulty is that the gains or losses
from trade depend upon the relative sizes of an individual’s actually
used and unused latent talents. Even if the government can condition
its taxation scheme on those variables that represent an actual use of
the factors, the (infeasible) first-best compensation scheme must also be
based on the latent talents of job-switchers. It is not difficult to show that
there are individuals who are identical in terms of current use of their
talents, and yet are either gainers or losers due to differences in size of
their latent talents. Given the usual scheme of taxation and subsidy, the
government has no mechanism to induce individuals to reveal their latent
talents. This means that if it wishes to ensure a Pareto improvement from
autarky, the government cannot avoid the overcompensation problem,
and thus in some cases fails to balance its budget.
1.1 The Related Literature
The most famous compensation scheme in the literature that sat-
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isfies the incentive compatibility requirement is proposed by Dixit and
Norman (1980, Ch. 3). The Dixit-Norman scheme arranges commodity
(and factor) taxes and subsidies such that consumers face autarky prices
for both outputs and factors, while producers face free trade prices. This
tax-subsidy scheme will raise non-negative governmental revenue, which
can then be redistributed back to consumers via a poll subsidy or some
other measure.
Kemp and Wan (1986) gave several counter-examples to the Dixit-
Norman results. For example, they describe cases in which the Dixit-
Norman scheme fails either because there is a kink in the production
possibilities frontier and hence no production gain from trade, or be-
cause they look at a pure exchange economy that implicitly violates the
Weymark condition of Dixit-Norman’s (1986) assumption. In their re-
sponse, Dixit and Norman (1986, p. 121) pointed out that Kemp and
Wan’s work tries “to investigate all logical possibilities, including pure
exchange economies and ones without any production transformation
possibilities, regardless of the empirical relevance of such constructs.”
My aim in this paper is to fill in precisely that gap by providing with
empirically relevant explanations of this unresolved debate. Above all, I
seek to discover why it is so difficult to carry out a compensation scheme,
given our present awareness that “the existence and the size of aggregate
production gains from trade is of unquestionable importance” (Dixit and
Norman 1986, p. 121). In order to place this difficulty of compensation
in a broader context, allow me to quote from Feenstra (1998):
We know surprisingly little about redistribution schemes, other
than that they often fail. The common problem is that ob-
taining the necessary information on who to compensate, and
by how much, creates severe disincentives. (p. 48)
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Feenstra and Lewis (1994) analyze the case in which all the factors of
production are imperfectly mobile.?5? [For the relevant case of positive
theory of trade using imperfectly mobile factors, see Mussa (1982) and
Grossman (1983).] They found that the regular Dixit-Norman scheme
may not lead to strict Pareto gains from trade, simply because all factors
of production will not move to other sectors when they face autarky factor
prices. It is this conditional factor-immobility (on factor prices) which
prevents the economy from achieving production efficiency. Therefore,
Feenstra and Lewis claim that the scheme must be complemented by an
incentive for factor mobility — a subsidy for job-switchers. It is thus
that there arises a role for relocation subsidy, in the form of a program
of trade adjustment assistance (hereafter, TAA).
Whereas Feenstra and Lewis (1994) looked at the case where all the
factors are imperfectly mobile, this paper proposes a model in which I al-
low a factor to be perfectly mobile between sectors. The model assumes
(a) that individual agents differ in their relative and absolute talents
to undertake different occupations, and (b) that agents can switch be-
tween occupations. Under these circumstances, we can find a case where
the identification of gainers or losers for some groups of individuals has
become impossible. Because the gains and losses of agents must be cal-
culated from a comparison of the factor returns between actually used
and unused latent talents, the tax-subsidy scheme that is tied to the
current observable variables will not work. Furthermore, note that the
role played by the adjustment costs differs between Feenstra-Lewis’s pa-
per and this paper. Feenstra and Lewis can make the case for the TAA
program because they assume positive adjustment costs for all factual
factors. In my model, based on the primitives with respect to the hetero-
?5? Imperfect mobility is not to be confused with the related concept of immobility. In the
celebrated specific-factor model, the specific factors are immobile. Imperfectly mobile
factors move from one industry to another, but with a real adjustment cost.
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geneity of individual talents, we derive the (effective) adjustment costs
for each individual. And surprisingly enough, we find that, for some
agents, adjustment costs can be negative.
On a similar topic, Spector (2001) addressed the difficulty of creating
a Pareto-improving compensation scheme. Spector’s concern is closely
related to the public economics approach to optimal income taxation.
Consumer utility is determined both from the commodity bundle and
from the decision of labor supply. The labor-leisure tradeoff creates the
disincentive problem for any income taxation scheme. My model excludes
the labor-leisure tradeoff and assumes that consumers derive utility from
consumption bundles only.
Another point of departure is the assumption about the objective
of the government. Spector presumes that the government is a typi-
cal Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function maximizer, i.e. one that
tries to achieve a specific weighted redistribution between rich and poor.
When Spector limits government intervention to income taxation only,
he effectively shows that such a government cannot achieve a Pareto
improvement. This paper shows the difficulty of implementing a Pareto-
improving mechanism even if we were to allow a combination of any tax
and subsidy (including the one on commodities and factors), as long as
the scheme is based on currently observable variables.
1.2 Heterogeneity of Agents in This Paper
In the model proposed in this paper, I presume the individual agents
to be doubly heterogeneous, in the sense that they differ in both the
absolute and relative magnitudes of their capabilities in their different
occupations. Let us explain the heterogeneity used in the model via an
example.
Suppose that every individual could, in principle, work either as an
opera singer or as an economics professor. Naturally, every individual
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differs in how well he can sing opera arias. The same can be said about
economic professorial skill. These differences can be called heterogeneity
in absolute advantages. Of course no individual is going to be equally
good at both things. Individuals’ relative strengths are always going to
vary widely. These variances can be called heterogeneity in comparative
advantage. Some will be very good at singing but mediocre at economics,
others the other way around, and still some others good at both. A way
to capture these differing absolute and comparative advantages is to as-
sume that for every individual j ∈ J , there is a vector (θj , τ j) of ability.
The element θ (of the vector) measures how much “effective output of
economic-professorial services” the individual can produce in a given pe-
riod, while the other element τ measures how much “effective output of
opera singing” the individual can produce over the same period. The size
of these elements will inevitably differ across individuals, and this fact
bespeaks a heterogeneity in absolute advantage. Also, the ratio of the el-
ements of the ability vector, θτ , reflects the size of the comparative advan-
tage an individual possesses in economics professorship (Ruffin 1988)?6?.
A relatively low θτ indicates a comparative advantage in opera-singing.
Note that the model I am promulgating here shares many aspects with
the Roy (1951) model that had been put forth within the field of labor
economics.?7?
Furthermore, every individual j faces an occupational choice in his
life. Because I model this as an occupational choice, the decision is a
?6? The setup is somewhat similar to the model of interpersonal comparative advantage
introduced in Ruffin (1988). While Ruffin’s model allows for the multi-sector use of
the same factors of production, I model this comparative advantage as a source of oc-
cupational choice. Also, my model allows for a continuum of varieties of individual
heterogeneity, whereas Ruffin introduced a finite set of groups of individuals. Ruffin’s
case would violate my model’s assumption of atomless agents.
?7? I was not aware of the labor literature until I had completed my analysis of a similar
model as Roy. I thank Sujata Visaria, a fellow graduate student at Columbia, for bringing
my attention to the literature on labor economics.
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discrete one: whether to work as an opera singer or as an economics
professor. Of course the decision will depend on such economic variables
as relative output price. Given a particular economic environment, an
individual might choose to be an opera singer, but wish to switch to
being an economist after a change has occurred in the terms of trade.
Note as well that each element of the ability vector is indivisible and
non-transferable?8?.
1.3 The Plan of the Rest of this Paper
The remainder of this paper is divided into eight sections. In the
next section I present a non-technical overview of the model. In section
3, I develop a simple general equilibrium trade model having two final
outputs. This model comprises a large number of heterogeneous agents
who possess both generic-mobile and individual-specific occupational fac-
tors. I examine the Walrasian (trading) equilibrium of the model, and
show that there are aggregate gains from trade. Section 4 is devoted to
the presentation of the key result as to the existence of gainers among
displaced individuals. Section 5 provides us with an example of a welfare
comparison among individuals, when there is no ex post compensation
scheme. Section 6 introduces the pertinent definitions and properties
of compensation schemes. Section 7 seeks to arrive at an unanticipated
compensation scheme by using various taxes and subsidies based on the
currently observable variables. Section 8 looks at the case in which in-
dividual agents learn about the compensation scheme and explore the
disincentive problem by manipulating the mechanism. The final section
?8? In a sense, the economy in this model has some similarity to the Ricardian economy
with a large number of commodities. (Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson 1977) Whereas
the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson model focuses on comparative advantage across differ-
ent categories of outputs, our model emphasizes both the absolute and the comparative
advantages of individuals’ talents. Another difference: our model focuses primarily on
the welfare change of individual agents, while also examining those compensation schemes
that seek to attain the Pareto improvement.
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offers some conclusions, and proposes a few future extensions.
2. Overview of the Model
Let me begin with a non-technical and heuristic overview of this pa-
per’s analytical approach, postponing until the next section the formal
development of the model. Consider a small open economy that faces
exogenously given international output prices. Output markets are as-
sumed to be competitive, both internationally and domestically. Putting
aside the distributional concerns, it can be said that in the aggregate
sense free trade is more efficient than any form of restricted trade for
such an economy because there are no terms-of-trade externalities and
hence no room for positive optimal tariffs. The economy consists of a con-
tinuum of individual agents who own two types of factor endowments:
generic factors, and occupation-specific talents.
The generic-type factors are homogenous factors of production whose
property rights are well defined and traded competitively via domestic
markets. Examples of these generic factors are unskilled wage labor,
capital goods whose values are easily transformed into money or other
types of capital goods, and all kinds of homogeneous inputs used in the
production of outputs.
Occupation-specific talents characterize the heterogeneity of individ-
ual agents in this economy. Agents vary in both their absolute and their
relative strength in the different occupations. The occupation-specific
talents are specific to the individual and to the industry (or chosen occu-
pation). This can mean that human capital is sector-specific, and yet an
agent still can have multiple talents in different sectors in different de-
grees. In addition to the specificity of talents, the other important char-
acteristic of this specific factor is that it is intangible?9?(Murphy 1986).
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Unlike the generic factors spoken of in the previous paragraph, the prop-
erty rights of the specific talents (or occupational abilities) are not well
defined, and the skills are embodied in each individual. In other words,
the occupational talents are intangible and non-contractible.?10? Given
that these talents belong to a utility-maximizing economic agent, I pos-
tulate that the occupational abilities are indivisible. In other words, I
assume that the individual will make a full effort,?11?and thus I believe
that the return for this occupational talent will appear in the form of
residual profits rather than as market prices multiplied by the number of
efficiency units. I also assume that every individual agent in this econ-
omy is a residual claimant of his own specific talents that are in actual
use.
Furthermore, I presume that each individual undertakes only one
occupation at a time. The decision is discrete; I do not allow for the
existence of individual agents who are employed in multiple sectors.?12?
Usually, this type of non-convex decision-space would create difficulties
for us in terms of verifying the existence of the equilibrium; here however,
we are depending upon the result achieved by Hildenbrand (1974), who
showed that non-convexity can be overcome by having a continuum of
?9? To put this matter differently, “human capitals are embodied in each individual” as
Kevin Murphy says in his unpublished thesis.
?10? This intangible nature will explain the non-verifiability and the non-transferability
of the individual’s talents. The reason we assume here that the property rights are not
well defined is that we seek to exclude the possible existence of both insurance and stock
markets for the talents of individuals.
?11? This is because the use of talent factors is not in the utility functions of individual
agents. When the cost (disutility) of effort is zero, agents will maximize their effort-
level up to the limit so that they can consume as large a set of consumption bundles
as possible. For the analysis of choice of effort level when individual tastes include a
disutility from making some efforts, see Spector (2001).
?12? Remember, Feenstra-Lewis (1994) allow for the supplying of one factor to multiple
industries. They do not, however, allow for the existence of perfectly mobile generic
factors, as we do in this paper.
178
v01
Occupational Choice and Compensation for Losers from International Trade 13
atomless?13?individual agents. (For the relevant cases of a large economy
with non-convexities, see also Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995,
Section 17.I, p. 627).)
Now that we have depicted the nature of the endowments held by
individual agents, let us now present a simplest possible general equi-
librium model, namely the one with two output goods and thus with
two occupations and one generic factor.?14? Let X (respectively, Y ) de-
note the output good that is an export (respectively, import) good for
home, and that is produced with the occupational ability θ (respectively,
τ). Let K denote the total amount of the generic factor endowed in the
economy. An individual j ∈ J can be characterized by an occupational
ability vector (θj , τ j) and by an endowment of generic factor Kj . Let
PX and PY denote the output prices for X and Y . Let r denote the
market price for the generic factor. Given each individual’s endowment
of ability and generic factor, he calculates the potential residual returns
from every (here, two) occupational choice.
Let πX and πY denote such residual returns from two sectors. Agents
can freely trade generic factors at the market price r, in order to maximize
their best available occupational returns. Since agents are price-takers
in both the output and the generic-factor markets, they compare the ex-
pected residual returns between different occupations. Agents will choose
which sector to produce as they compare: πX  πY . The economy takes
the distribution of the ability vectors to be given by (θj , τ j) ∼ F (θ, τ),
where F (θ, τ) represents the joint cumulative distribution function. I
assume that F (θ, τ) has a full support over a compact and convex set,
and that its shape is common knowledge. Its density function f(θ, τ) is
bounded, and continuously differentiable. I also assume that the avail-
?13? “Atomless” means that no point measure has a positive Lebesgue measure.
?14? Many parts of this analysis can also be applied to the basic diagrams used in the
specific-factors model of trade.
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able technology (production functions for both X and Y ) is common
knowledge as well. The technology is characterized by constant returns
to scale. Its production function is increasing in every input and is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada con-
ditions. The tastes of the consumers are assumed to be identical and
homothetic. Therefore, I focus on the agents’ heterogeneity with respect
to their factor incomes.
The terms of trade, the relative price between X and Y (can be
represented as PXPY ), is the key decision variable for each individual. To
see this clearly, we can utilize familiar diagrams normally used to de-
scribe specific-factor models of production. (See Fig. 1.) Given both the
specification of production functions and the individual talents (θj , τ j),
we can draw curves representing the value of marginal product for the
generic factor for both occupations. Let VMPKX and VMPKY denote
such curves. The vertical axis represents the monetary value of marginal
product for the generic factor given the occupational talents of the in-
dividuals. The horizontal axis represents the quantity of generic factors
being employed in the production of each output.
Fig. 1 Value of marginal product for the generic factor.
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Let lower case letter k denote the employment (use) rather than the
endowment, K, of generic factors. Both curves are downward-sloping in
k, this showing the property of diminishing marginal product of a generic
factor.
Both the elements of the ability vector (θ and τ) and the relative out-
put price (PXPY ) are the shift-parameters for the VMPKX and VMPKY
curves. The higher θ implies the higher position of VMPKX . Similarly,
the higher τ implies the higher position of VMPKY . The larger tal-
ent induces the corresponding value-of-marginal-product curves to shift
up. An increase in the relative price of X, relative to Y , will shift the
VMPKX curve up and the VMPKY curve down. A decrease in the
relative price of X induces a movement the other way around. When
individuals calculate their residual profits, they take the generic factor
price r as given, even though the equilibrium value of r depends on the
relative price PXPY .
?15?The area below the VMPK curves and above the
horizontal line at r represents the residual reward (or profit) π derived
from the corresponding occupational talent. Given the relative price, PXPY ,
an individual with (θj , τ j) will produce X if πX(θ
j) > πY (τ
j), will pro-
duce Y if πX(θ
j) < πY (τ
j), and will be indifferent as to producing either
X or Y if πX(θ
j) = πY (τ
j). (Of course, we can deem this indifference
case a measure zero event, given our atomless-agent assumptions.)
Fig. 2 shows the graph of the occupational rewards (profits), πX(θ
j)
and πY (τ
j), for a given individual, (θj , τ j), over the possible range of
relative prices PXPY ≡ P . The vertical axis represents the monetary value
of occupational rewards, given the talent of the individual. The hori-
zontal axis represents the relative price of output. (Note that in Fig. 2’s
graph the height corresponds to the area of the previous graph, Fig. 1.)
Let P be a shorthand way of denoting PXPY . Let the intersection of the
?15? And of course, the equilibrium value of r depends also on the shape of distribution
F (θ, τ) of the individuals’ talents.
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Fig. 2 Individual occupational rewards, given output price.
two occupational-reward curves occur at P ∗j for an individual (θj , τ j)
The individual will produce Y when the level of relative output price
is P < P ∗j . When P = P ∗j , he is indifferent as to producing either
X or Y . He will produce X whenever P > P ∗j . Note that, for any
trade liberalization, the shifts in terms of trade occur in a discrete man-
ner. Then, for some positive discrete change Δ > 0 in the relative price
P , we have the ex ante price P 0 and the ex post price P 1 = P 0 + Δ.
When P 0 < P 1 < P ∗j , then the individual is a producer in sector Y in
both periods. (One might say that he is stuck in Y production.) This
sector-Y -stayer loses out owing to an increase in the relative price. When
P ∗j < P 0 < P 1, then the individual is producing in the sector X in both
periods. This sector-X-stayer benefits from the positive price change. In
the case of this particular individual in Fig. 2, he changes his occupation
when the relative price changes cross the P ∗j point. With respect to the
case of job-switchers, P 0 < P ∗j < P 1, the welfare change is ambiguous.
Note that, up to this point, our argument has not depended on the as-
sumption about a specific distribution of talents, F (θ, τ). From now on,
we simply use the notation P ∗ in stead of P ∗j if the context can tell the
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Fig. 3 Ability vector space.
readers without confusion what I really mean.
In order to simplify the exposition, let us assume that the ability
vector (θ, τ) is distributed over the support of a unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1].
(The support of unit square is not at all central to the results of this
section. It is brought in here strictly for graphical convenience.) Let
us also assume that the production and utility functions ensure that the
autarky division of labor will occur at a 45-degree line on the unit square.
This line divides the unit square in two partitions: one representing the
X producers and the other the Y producers.?16?See Fig. 3.
Let PA =
(
PX
PY
)A
denote the autarky relative price. In Fig. 4, the
45-degree line OA corresponds to the relative autarky price PA. Now let
us think of the case of an economy that is opening itself up to free trade.
Let PW denote the world (international) relative price. Then, because
X is assumed to be a natural export good of the home country, it must
hold true that PW > PA. Given the world price PW , some individual
?16? This assumption of a symmetric autarky division of agents, while not central to our
results, does have the virtue of facilitating much easier expositions, since one need not
classify one’s results by case-by-case expositions.
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Fig. 4 A unit square subdivided according to occupational choice.
agents may decide to switch their occupations after they have compared
their present occupational rewards with those they could expect to re-
ceive in the other sector under the new price PW . Thus, as may be
seen in Fig. 4, we can draw a new ray from the origin, OW , that has a
steeper slope than OA. While OA corresponds to the autarky division
of occupational choice, OW represents the free-trade division of occu-
pational choice. Next, let us partition our unit square into 3 sections.
CX−X denotes the partition that includes all the job-staying individuals
who produced X in autarky and who keep producing X under free trade.
CY−Y denotes the partition of job-stayers in the sector Y . The partition
CY−X represents all the individuals who have switched occupations; for
instance, someone who produced Y in autarky, and who now produces X
under free trade. There are of course, given the direction of the output
price change, no job-switchers in the opposite direction.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between Figures 2
and 4. Each individual has a different job-switching value, P ∗. The
location of this trigger value depends only on the agent’s comparative
advantage, hence the relative size of the talents: θτ . Note also, in Fig. 4,
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that there is a one-to-one mapping between the relative size of the talents
and the slope of the ray from the origin to the point that represents
the individual’s endowment. The higher the value θτ , the higher the
comparative advantage the agent has in producing X; and therefore, the
flatter becomes the slope of the ray from the origin at which the agent
is located in the unit square. This can easily be seen, because the slope
γ can be found to be the inverse of θτ by using the equation of the ray
from the origin: τ = γθ.
For the same relative price change, different individuals face differ-
ent decisions for their occupation choices. Fig. 5 compares the residual
reward values for representative agents from the three groups of individ-
uals having different comparative advantages. Note that Fig. 5 contains
Fig. 5 A comparison of three types of individuals.
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the same diagrams as Fig. 2, showing three different agents with different
trigger values P ∗: an agent from group CX−X (a job-stayer in sector
X), an agent from group CY−Y (a job-stayer in sector Y ), and an agent
from group CY−X (a job-switcher from sector Y to sector X). The
agent from group CX−X has a low value of P ∗, the agent from group
CY−X a medium value, and the agent from group CY−Y a high value.
Only the job-switchers experience that relative price change from P 0 to
P 1 = P 0 + Δ which crosses over the trigger value P ∗, where Δ > 0.
We can conclude that any rise in the relative price of X will favor the
job-stayers in industry X, and disfavor the job-stayers in industry Y .
The third graph, however, provides ambiguous results with respect to
the job-switchers from Y to X. In fact, we can conclude that there exist
both winners and losers among those who switch their occupations.
Fig. 6 shows us that the factor separating the winners from the losers
among job-switchers is the comparative advantage of individuals. The
Fig. 6 Gainers and losers among job-switchers.
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left-hand panel in Fig. 6 provide us with finer partitions of the group of
agents from CY−X (job-switchers from the sector Y to the sector X) into
gainers and losers. As for the right-hand panel in Fig. 6, these graphs
represent the profit functions for the corresponding agents (gainers and
losers) given a discrete price change. Among the job-switchers, each
individual has a different relative size of his talents, θτ , and hence a
different job-switching trigger-value of relative price P ∗. Given the same
increase in the relative price of X, it will be the agents with a higher θτ
value who tend to be the gainers. Here in Fig. 6, I provide an example
of two types of agents: a loser among job-switchers (the upper graph on
the right-hand panel) and a gainer among job-switchers (the lower graph
on the right-hand panel).
Given that there exists this mixture of gainers and losers among
job-switching individuals, we are now able to explain the difficulty a gov-
ernment experiences when trying to carry out a fully Pareto improving
compensation scheme while not providing overcompensation to the job-
switchers. Let the government be capable of utilizing any taxation and
subsidy scheme, based on the variables it can currently observe. Let
us especially allow the government to use a tax-subsidy combination for
both output goods and factors of production, including a residual return
for the talents of individuals. Let us assume further that the tax (sub-
sidy) base for the government can be restricted to currently observable
variables. Thus, a scheme of wage insurance based on the information
about individuals’ previous occupations prior to their job switching is
not allowed.
A Pareto-improving compensation scheme for job-staying individ-
uals can easily be created. The direction and size of gain or loss are
calculated in a manner similar to that seen in the case for specific (im-
mobile) factors in the specific-factors model. The percentage gain or loss
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for job-staying individuals is the same for all of the stayers, regardless of
the sizes of their talents, whether currently or previously in use.
As far as the job-switchers are concerned, the creation of a Pareto-
improving compensation scheme cannot help but usher in certain com-
plications. This is because the size and the direction of individuals’ gains
or losses are not necessary correlated with currently observable variables.
Note in particular the percentage change in occupational residual prof-
its will be the same for all the individuals on the same ray from ori-
gin. Nonetheless, the government cannot distinguish winners from losers
within the job-switching individuals who are reaping the same amount
of residual profits from the current production activities. Thus, while in
Fig. 7 the iso-percentage-gain-or-loss lines are the rays from the origin,
the iso-profit lines from the current production are the vertical lines show-
ing ex-post producers from sector X. (The horizontal lines show ex-post
producers from sector Y .) Thus, Fig. 7 depicts the case of job-switching
individuals who move from sector Y to sector X.
The left-hand panel in Fig. 7 depicts the iso-percentage gain-loss
lines, while the right-hand panel in Fig. 7 depicts the iso-current profit
lines for ex post producers of the sector X outputs. The iso-percentage
gain-loss lines are the rays from the origin, while the iso-current profit
lines for X producers are parallel vertical lines. The closer the iso-
percentage gain-loss lines are to the OA line (and hence the flatter the
slope of the rays from the origin), the larger are the gains (and the smaller
the losses). (Among the many rays from origin depicted in Fig. 7, it is the
OZ line which represents the zero gain-loss line for job-switching individ-
uals.) The iso-current profit lines, located toward the right of the panel,
have higher values of current profits than do the ones located toward
the left. While the actual sizes and directions of individuals’ gains and
losses depend on the knowledge of the iso-percentage gain-loss lines, the
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Fig. 7 Job-switching individuals.
government can only observe the information based on the iso-current
profit lines.
For example, when we look at the two points q and r on both of the
diagrams, we see that the points have the same value of θ and yet have
different values for τ . The individual on the point q has a larger τ , while
the individual on the point r has a smaller one. The difference of the
value of τ is large enough that, when it comes to opening up to trade,
the individual on the point q is a loser and the individual on the point r
is a gainer. And yet they both appear to be the same from the point of
view of the government, since they are making the same current profits.
In other words, although the points q and r are on the same iso-current
profit line, they are on different iso-percentage gain-loss lines.
The analysis of the preceding paragraph has made it abundantly
clear that the government cannot both attain a Pareto-improving com-
pensation and avoid awarding excess compensation. For the government
must give the same amount of subsidy to r as q, even though the individ-
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ual on the point r is actually a gainer from trade. So too, the government
must provide the same amount of subsidy or tax to the individuals on
the same iso-current profit line, regardless of their actual gains or losses.
Indeed, if the government wants to ensure Pareto improvement, then it
must see to it that the amount of subsidy is the same for all as it is for the
worst individuals who are on the upper side of the square in Fig. 7. For
this reason it is inevitable that the government will overcompensate the
job-switching individuals, with the exception being the ones seen exactly
on the line segment of the upper side of the square.
In this section, I have sought to do two things for my reader. First,
provide the reader with an intuitive diagrammatic explanation of why
there exist winners among those occupation-switchers who are facing the
change in terms of trade. And second, make clear the impossibility of
carrying out a compensation scheme that achieves Pareto improvement
without overcompensating certain job-switchers. The formal model will
be developed in the following section, in order to make the case in a more
precise manner.
3. The Formal Model
This section develops the basic model of occupational choice with
which we will be working in the following sections. Parts of the model’s
structure bear a close resemblance to the independently discovered frame-
work?17?first proposed in Roy (1951) and elaborated on by Mussa (1982,
pp. 131-134).
?17? It was only after I had completed my analysis that I discovered these classic works
by Roy (1951) and Mussa (1982) that introduce a similar setup of the model I provide
here. The Roy model is used to analyze the inequality of earnings by individual workers,
but never used for the analysis of international trade. Mussa introduces a similar setup
as a way of backing up his assumption about the convex input transformation curve.
Despite our similarity of setups, however, Mussa never solves for the analysis I provide
in this paper.
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Consider a small open economy that produces two final goods X
and Y , with positive prices PX and PY . Final goods are produced by
a combination of two types of factor inputs: (1) generic factor, and (2)
individual and industry specific factor. The first-type generic factor is a
homogeneous factor of production that is perfectly mobile between sec-
tors. The second-type specific factor represents the agent’s occupational
ability. This takes the form of a vector whose elements represent both
factual and counter-factual (latent) factors of production. The size of
the factual factor is proportional to the effective output an individual
can produce in a given period of time. I also make the assumption that
all individuals are endowed with multiple talents in different occupations
and to varying degrees. Despite this, the individuals are assumed to
undertake just one job at a time. Note also that I adopt the conven-
tional trade-model hierarchy for commodities — a goods-factors split —
whereby final goods are internationally tradeable outputs and factors are
non-tradeable inputs.
The economy consists of a large number of individual agents, each
of whom is a residual claimant who collects all the residual profits after
paying the cost of production that is incurred for any generic factor of
production.?18? Note that the individuals are residual claimants for the
“actual use” of their talents. They may have many different kinds of
“latent” (unused) talents, but to these they can lay no claim. In other
?18? This notion of residual claimant property should not be interpreted too literally. It
tries to capture the specificity of a certain factor of production, and the difficulty of
verifying its magnitude. Any worker in the economy possesses both the generic factors
and the human-specific and industry-specific talents. One interpretation of this notion of
residual claimant property is the self-employment of an agent. We are not, however, re-
stricted to the self-employment interpretation. For even if the individual is hired by some
outside firm, he still has full negotiating power to get all the residuals from production,
because he still has an outside option of becoming self-employed. Thus we can assume
that all the individuals in the economy are residual claimants of the talents actually used
in their current production process.
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words, a person chooses to produce a good by hiring as many inputs
as necessary from the competitive markets, and he then earns residual
profits from his activity. However good he may be at any other job, he
can lay no claim to the residual profits from those activities in which
he is not actually engaged. By choosing one job over another, a person
forgoes his other opportunities. The opportunity cost for the person can
be said to be the return from his second-best job, given the terms of
trade.?19? The difference between his actual return and his second-best
return will differ across individuals. Then too, the ranking of the best
jobs may change when the environment changes. Nevertheless, I still can
claim that a person is a residual claimant for his best talent, given the
environment.
Consider a continuum of agents j ∈ J , each of whom is endowed
with an individual-specific occupational ability vector (θj , τ j) ∼ F (θ, τ)
and a generic factor Kj ≥ 0.?20?Let f(θ, τ) ≥ 0 denote the joint density
function for F (θ, τ), and assume that f is integrable over any partition
of the ability space Θ. Agents are price takers in the output and the
generic-factor markets. An economy-wide endowment of generic factors
is inelastically supplied at K =
∫
J
Kj . Agents trade their generic factors
freely via the competitive market. The factor price is denoted by r > 0.
Each element of the ability vector (θj , τ j) represents an occupational
talent; their magnitudes measure the innate capabilities of the agent j in
the production of X and Y .
An agent decides either to produce X using θ, or Y using τ . An
element of the ability vector (θj , τ j) is indivisible and non-transferable.
It can be considered a managerial talent of the owner, if we think of each
?19? In this sense the size of the opportunity cost, as well as the size of the factor return,
changes when there is a change in the terms of trade.
?20? The distribution of Kj can be quite general, since there is a competitive market for
it. Therefore we will not specify its distribution function but instead simply say that the
total mass is represented by K.
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agent as being a (self-employed) firm. An ability vector (θj , τ j) ∈ Θ is
unobservable to the government, but its aggregate distribution is publicly
known. Θ ⊂ R2 represents the space of individual characteristics. Θ is
assumed to be a compact and convex set.
Having stipulated the individual characteristics, we are now ready to
describe the technological side of the economy. Technology is a nonrival
good, and every individual has access to the best available production
techniques. Thus, individuals differ only in the endowment of factors.
The timing of decision-making and market-clearing will be as follows.
1. The world market determines the relative output prices between PX
and PY . The home market takes them as given. In analyzing do-
mestic equilibrium, we will determine relative price endogenously.
But because all agents are infinitesimal, they take the equilibrium
prices as given.
2. The individual agent observes one’s own type vector (θj , τ j) ∈ Θ.
3. The agent forms a conjecture about the market factor-price r, fore-
sees the profit-maximizing level of generic-factor employment, and
calculates the occupational rewards or residual profits πjX(PX , r, θ
j)
and πjY (PY , r, τ
j) to be gained from both occupational choices.
4. The agents decide (based on the expected size of rewards) in which
sector to produce, and hire from the factor market the profit-
maximizing level of the generic factor. They choose to produce
either X or Y (not both, and not a convex combination of the two)
using θ or τ . This process will determine the economy-wide size of
the specific factors.
5. The generic-factor market clears. The equilibrium factor-price r
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should be consistent with the conjectures the agents have had.?21?
6. Given domestic production and domestic demand, the home coun-
try engages in trade with the world.
Both outputs are assumed to be produced with symmetrical pro-
duction functions?22?that are twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, homogeneous of degree one. In particular, let
us assume for simplicity’s sake the following Cobb-Douglas specification:⎧⎨⎩ xj(k
j
X , θ
j) = (kjX)
a(θj)1−a
yj(kjY , τ
j) = (kjY )
a(τ j)1−a
where a ∈ (0, 1) (1)
where xj and yj are individual level outputs, where kjX and k
j
Y represent
the individual-level uses of the generic factor, and where θj and τ j rep-
resent the occupational talents. Note that the use of the generic factor
is not constrained by the individual endowment Kj , because there exists
a perfectly competitive market for this factor and because agents can
freely buy from the market and sell portions of their endowments.?23?
Given the output prices PX and PY , and the factor price r, individ-
uals are able to compare the expected rewards (net of payments to the
employed generic factors) πjX and π
j
Y from different occupations. Based
on the regular profit-maximization program, we can depict such a com-
parison in the form of the following two equations.
?21? This conjecture can be thought of as having emerged from the rational expectation
hypothesis. Actually, however, any disequilibrium adjustment process will do the job,
such as the assumption of the existence of the Walrasian auctioneer.
?22? This symmetry of the production functions is not essential to my results. It is just
that by delegating all the heterogeneity to the endowment side, we are able to radically
simplify the algebraic calculations.
?23? The size of the endowment Kj matters only with respect to out calculation of the
factor income for an individual. Agents can buy more than they possess, because we
are implicitly assuming the existence of a perfect capital market in which people freely
borrow money to pay for generic factors in excess of their possession.
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πjX(PX , r, θ
j) = max
kX
PX · xj(kX , θj)− r · kX
πjY (PY , r, τ
j) = max
kX
PY · yj(kY , τ j)− r · kY
(2)
By calculating the hypothetical employment levels of optimized generic
factors, we arrive at⎧⎨⎩ k
j
X(PX , r, θ
j) =
�
aPX
r
� 1
1−a · θj , or
kjY (PY , r, τ
j) =
�
aPY
r
� 1
1−a · τ j .
(3)
The occupational decision is based on the relative size of the post op-
timization level of the occupation rewards; thus, πjX(PX , r, θ
j)  πjY
(PY , r, τ
j). And the post optimization level of the rewards can be calcu-
lated as⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
πjX(PX , r, θ
j) =
�
(PX)
1
1−a � 1
r
� a
1−a
�
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
��
· θj , or
πjY (PY , r, τ
j) =
�
(PY )
1
1−a � 1
r
� a
1−a
�
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
��
· τ j .
(4)
The size of the occupational rewards increases with the sizes of the agents’
abilities and with their own output prices. Note now, in equation (4),
the symmetry of the production functions from (1) neutralizes the effect
of generic-factor price(Ruffin and Jones 1977).
Now we can partition the ability space Θ by self-selection of indi-
vidual. Noting that the notation P can be utilized as a shorthand way
of expressing PXPY , we can see that⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
R =
�
(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j < P
1
1−a · θj
�
S =
�
(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j > P
1
1−a · θj
�
,
(5)
where the partition R represents the individuals who produce X, and the
partition S represents the Y producers. Note that the ray from origin,
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which can be expressed as τ j = γ · θj where γ is a constant, is the
division-line between the two partitions.?24?
Up to now, we have described how individuals choose their occu-
pations and get involved in a production process. In equation (5), the
partition of individual agents represents an endogenous determination of
the allocation of specific-factors available in the economy as a whole. We
now begin to examine the economy-wide allocation of specific factors.
Let AR (respectively, AS) denote the area-integration of the region R
(respectively, S). This area-integration represents the mass of individuals
in the corresponding partition. Let V Rθ (respectively, V
S
τ ) denote the
volume integral with respect to the variable θ (respectively, τ) on the
region R (respectively, S). This volume integral represents the economy-
wide employment size of each specific factor. Our next equations bring
us the mass of the individual agents in partitions R and S, respectively:⎧⎨⎩ AR ≡
��
R
1 · f(θ, τ)dθdτ
AS ≡ ��
S
1 · f(θ, τ)dθdτ.
(6)
The economy-wide size of the specific factors can be expressed by the
following equations. ⎧⎨⎩ V Rθ ≡
��
R
θ · f(θ, τ)dτdθ
V Sτ ≡
��
S
τ · f(θ, τ)dθdτ
. (7)
When the joint density function f(θ, τ) has a full support and is continu-
ous, it is not difficult to show that both AR and V Rθ are strictly increasing
in P and that AS and V Sτ are strictly decreasing in P .
Given the self-selection condition of individual occupational choice
as depicted back in equation (5), the generic-factor market will clear, and
?24? I am using a strict inequality for both partitions, simply because the measure of the
line τj =
(PX )
1
1−a
(PY )
1
1−a
· θj is zero.
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its full-employment condition is expressed by the following equation.∫∫
(θj ,τj)∈R
kjX(PX , r, θ
j)f(θ, τ)dθdτ
+
∫∫
(θj ,τj)∈S
kjY (PY , r, τ
j)f(θ, τ)dθdτ = K. (8)
The factor-market demand, as represented by the left-hand side of equa-
tion (8), is an aggregation of all the individuals’ factor-demand over each
partition, R and S.
By plugging the optimized values seen in equation (3) for the employment-
level generic-factors into (8), we arrive at(
aPX
r
) 1
1−a
·
∫∫
R
θjf(θ, τ)dθdτ
+
(
aPY
r
) 1
1−a
·
∫∫
S
τ jf(θ, τ)dθdτ = K. (9)
By utilizing the notation in (7), we can rewrite equation (9) as(
aPX
r
) 1
1−a
· V Rθ +
(
aPY
r
) 1
1−a
· V Sτ = K. (10)
Note that both V Rθ and V
S
τ depend upon the relative output price P .
Thus, equation (10) implicitly tell us that r, the reward for generic factor,
is a function of the output prices, with K and a being parameters. We
then assume that the solution of (10) for r is unique, and can be written
as the equation:
r = r(PX , PY ). (11)
In order to derive in a simple manner the properties of the reward
function (11) for the generic-factor, we will postulate a specific functional
form for the demand side of the economy.
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3.1 Demand Side
We now describe the demand side of the economy. Generally, each
consumer j’s problem can be depicted thus:
max
CX ,CY
u(CjX , C
j
Y ) s.t. PX · CjX + PY · CjY ≤ Ij ,
where (CjX , C
j
Y ) represents the consumption bundle for the individual j.
His income is expressed as
Ij = r ·Kj +max
X,Y
{πjX(PX , r, θj), πjY (PY , r, τ j)}. (12)
In general, the utility function shall be twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly quasi-concave, homothetic, and strictly increasing. For
simplicity of exposition, let us assume the following Cobb-Douglas form.
(Note that the constant term has been added in order to make both the
Walrasian-demand and the indirect-utility functions simple.)
u(CjX , C
j
Y ) = 2
�
CjXC
j
Y . (13)
We now can utilize the following price-normalization:⎧⎨⎩ PX = pPY = 1p . (14)
Note that P = PXPY = p
2. Given the price normalization seen in (14), the
indirect utility function can be normalized to the income of the individual
(in terms of the parameter p):
v(PX , PY , I
j) =
Ij√
PXPY
= Ij(p) (15)
Note that the last equality takes into account the dependence of income
on relative output price.
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By utilizing the above normalization of price parameter p, we can
express the equilibrium level r as the following equation:
r(p) = a · K−(1−a)
[
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) + p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]1−a
. (16)
Note that the value of the economy-wide employment of the specific fac-
tors, V Rθ (p) and V
S
τ (p), depends on the relative-output-price parameter
p.
The equilibrium-level national income can also be expressed as a
function of relative output-price p:
I(p) =
∫
(θj ,τj)∈Θ
Ij(p)
= r(p) · K +
∫∫
R
πjX · f(θ, τ)dτdθ +
∫∫
S
πjY · f(θ, τ)dθdτ. (17)
We now can state an intermediate result, concerning the relationship
between national income and factor income for the generic factor.
Lemma 1 Generic-factor income is proportional to national income with
this relationship being expressed as the equation
r(p) · K = a · I(p). (18)
This follows directly from equations (4), (16) and (17). This propor-
tional relationship in (18) holds true because the production functions
for the two sectors are Cobb-Douglas and symmetric.
Proof. We know from (16) that
[
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) + p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]
= K ·
(
r(p)
a
) 1
1−a
.
Then, by plugging (4) into (17) we get
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I(p) = r(p) ·K +(
1
r(p)
) a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)
·
[
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) + p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]
.
Combining the above two equations yields us
I(p) = r(p) ·K ·
(
1 +
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)
· a −11−a
)
.
By simplifying this we get
I(p) =
r(p) ·K
a
,
which is precisely equivalent to the condition seen in (18).
It also is to be noted that the national factor-income is equal to the
gross national product:
I(p) = PX ·
∫∫
R
xj(p, r, θj) · f(θ, τ)dτdθ +
PY ·
∫∫
S
yj(p, r, τ j) · f(θ, τ)dθdτ. (19)
The relationship seen in (18) can also be confirmed by using (19).
3.2 Goods Market Equilibrium
Let us now investigate the goods market equilibrium. There are two
equilibria: one for autarky and the other for free trade. We will seek for
the goods-market-clearing conditions for the autarky equilibrium, and
examine the expression of trade volumes for the trading equilibrium.
A trading equilibrium is represented by a net import vector m(p),
for a given relative price p:
m(p) ≡ (EDX(p), EDY (p)) = (CX(p)−X(p), CY (p)− Y (p)) , (20)
where EDX(p) and EDY (p) are the excess demand functions for sectors
X and Y , respectively, and where
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CX(p) =
��
Θ
CjXdF (θ, τ) and CY (p) =
��
Θ
CjY dF (θ, τ) (21)
and
X(p) =
��
R
xjdF (θ, τ) and Y (p) =
��
S
yjdF (θ, τ). (22)
Autarky is a special case where m(pA) = 0. Let us now derive
the conditions for the autarky equilibrium. By using the given utility
function (13), we can see that the Walrasian-demand functions for goods
X and Y will be written respectively as⎧⎨⎩ C
j
X(p, I
j) = I
j
2p
CjY (p, I
j) = p·I
j
2
=⇒
⎧⎨⎩ CX(p) =
I(p)
2p
CY (p) =
p·I(p)
2
where the left panel shows the individual demand functions and the right
panel shows the market demand functions. By utilizing the previous
results [derived by plugging (3) into (1) and using (7).], we can depict
the aggregate production in terms of p:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ x
j(kjX , θ
j) =
�
a·p
r(p)
� a
1−a · θj
yj(kjY , τ
j) =
�
a
p·r(p)
� a
1−a · τ j
=⇒
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ X(p) =
�
a·p
r(p)
� a
1−a · V Rθ (p)
Y (p) =
�
a
p·r(p)
� a
1−a · V Sτ (p)
.
Thus, when p = pA, the following equations must hold true:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
I(p)
2p =
�
a·p
r(p)
� a
1−a · V Rθ (p)
p·I(p)
2 =
�
a
p·r(p)
� a
1−a · V Sτ (p).
(23)
By using the result seen in (18), and the condition seen in (23) can be
rewritten as ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ V
R
θ (p) =
K
2 ·
�
r(p)
a·p
� 1
1−a
V Sτ (p) =
K
2 ·
�
p·r(p)
a
� 1
1−a
.
(24)
When we plug the equilibrium-level generic-factor return (16) into (24),
we get the following autarky condition for the economy-wide employment
of the specific occupational factors:
201
v01
36 ?????? 456 ?
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) = p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p) |p=pA . (25)
In autarky, we see that p = pA and this expression is explicitly noted in
equation (25).
We know that the change with respect to each specific factor’s economy-
wide employment has the opposite sign; that is:
sign
(
dV Rθ
dp
)
= −sign
(
dV Sτ
dp
)
for some dp.
Then, by taking the total derivative of the autarky condition seen in (25)
with respect to p, and after reassuring ourselves that the sign will be
adjusted, we arrive at
1
p(1− a) ·
[
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p)− p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]
+
[
p
1
1−a · dV
R
θ
dp
+ p
−1
1−a · dV
S
τ
dp
]
= 0, (26)
when p = pA.
When we look at the case p > pA, we know that the home country
exports the good X. Therefore the excess demand for X is negative —
i.e., EDX(p) < 0 — while the excess demand for Y is positive: EDY (p) >
0. This relationship can be expressed as
X(p) > CX(p) ⇔ p 11−a · V Rθ (p) > p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p) |p>pA . (27)
Similarly, we now can say that
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) < p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p) |p<pA . (28)
We also can derive an intermediate result, with respect to the return
for the generic factor K.
Lemma 2 Let pA be the autarky-level price parameter. The factor price
r(p) can be written as a function of the relative-output-price parameter
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p. Its value is U-shaped around p = pA; i.e., it is increasing in p when
p > pA, decreasing in p when p < pA, and it has a slope 0 at p = pA.
Proof. Let us first look at equation (16). Since we know that
a ·K−(1−a) > 0 regardless of the value of p, we would like to evaluate a
derivative of [
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) + p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]1−a
(29)
with respect to p. Let s(p) ≡ p 11−a ·V Rθ (p)+p−
1
1−a ·V Sτ (p). The derivative
of equation (29) can then be expressed as
(1− a) [s(p)]−a ds(p)
dp
.
Since (1− a) [s(p)]−a > 0, we need to check the signs of s�(p) = ds(p)dp :
s�(p) =
1
p(1− a) ·
[
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p)− p
−1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]
+
[
p
1
1−a · dV
R
θ
dp
+ p
−1
1−a · dV
S
τ
dp
]
. (30)
We know from autarky condition (26) that s�(p) = 0 when p = pA. By
utilizing the conditions (27) and (28), and by noting that the second term
in (30) is very small compared to the first term, we also can conclude
that s�(p) < 0 when p > pA and that s�(p) > 0 when p < pA. This
concludes the proof.
When we take the above lemma along with the condition (18), we
arrive at another important result about the existence of aggregate gains
from trade.
Proposition 1 Given the setup of the model, there exist aggregate gains
from international trade. That is, the real-valued national income I(p) is
U-shaped around p = pA. In other words, any deviation from the autarky
price will raise the level of real valued national income.
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Proof. It is obvious from, Lemmas 1 and 2.
Our trade model can attain gains from trade at the level of the
overall economy, even if it consists of a large number of heterogeneous
individuals who have multi-talents and who are allowed to change their
occupations.?25?
We have demonstrated the equilibrium property of this model char-
acterized by heterogeneous agents who face occupational choices. We
also have shown that there exist aggregate production gains from trade
in this economy. Now we must shift the focus to the welfare changes
of various groups within the economy. The foregoing analysis of the
changes in individuals’ welfare will serve as the basis of my explana-
tion of the difficulties attendant upon any attempt to implement a fully
Pareto-improving compensation scheme.
4. Welfare Changes of Individual Groups
Thus far in this paper, we have analyzed the equilibrium properties
of the model, with the focus being on the comparative statics of the
aggregated variables. Now we shift our focus, to the individuals within
the economy. More specifically, we will be comparing the well-being of
various groups (of the individuals) when there is a discrete change in
output prices. The first result concerns the welfare property of the group
of job-staying individuals.
Proposition 2 Job-stayers will gain from an increase in the relative
prices of their own outputs (those produced using applied talent). Job-
stayers will lose from a decrease in the relative prices of their own outputs.
?25? Note that such a non-convex decision space for an individual agent is usually a
problem, but it turns out OK for us.
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Fig. 8 Individual gains and losses.
These results are the same as the ones for specific-factor owners, in
the specific-factor model of international trade. In Fig. 8, the relative-
price change from autarky to free trade — a change from pA to pW —
is represented by a shift in the division-of-labor line from OA to OW .
Partitions CX−X and CY−Y each show a collection of job-staying indi-
viduals. Because the price-change is favorable to the exporting sector,
the sector-X-stayers gain and the sector-Y -stayers lose. We can see this
more formally, when we express the occupational return for X producers:
πjX(p, r, θ
j) =
[
p
1
1−a
(
1
r(p)
) a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)]
· θj (31)
In order to look into the details of equation (31), let us rewrite
equation (16) here.
r(p) = a ·K−(1−a)
[
p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) + p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]1−a
. (32)
By plugging equation (32) into (31), we obtain an expression of occupa-
tional reward in terms of output price:
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πjX(p, θ
j) =[
a
−a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a −a
1
1−a
)
Ka
]
·p
1
1−a ·
[
p
1
1−a ·V Rθ (p)+p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p)
]−a
· θj
= Ka(1− a) · p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a · θj .
Since the constant term Ka(1 − a) is positive and θj is nonnegative
by assumption, the derivative of p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a
has the same sign as the
derivative of πjX(p, θ
j) with respect to p. Therefore, showing that
d
(
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a
)
dp
> 0 (33)
is equivalent to carrying over the truth of the above proposition to the
case of the job-stayers in sector X:
d
(
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a
)
dp
= s−a · p
a
1−a · a ·
(
1
a(1− a) −
p · s�(p)
s(p)
)
.
Because we know that 0 < a < 1 and that p > 0, it is clear that
s−a · p
a
1−a · a > 0 and 1
a(1− a) > 0.
And because we know, from p > pA, that s�(p) < 0, we can conclude that(
1
a(1− a) −
p · s�(p)
s(p)
)
> 0.
In this way, we have shown that (33) holds. A similar analysis could easily
be carried out for the occupational rewards for Y , and hence the proof is
omitted. Note that this proposition is exactly about the monotonicity of
the reward values shown in Fig. 2. When the relative price p of X goes
up, the reward from Y declines and the reward from X increases.
The second result concerns the well-being of job-switching individ-
uals.
Proposition 3 Among those who change their occupations, there exist
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both gainers and losers from trade without compensation. When there is
a change in the relative prices, whether the job-switching individual wins
or not depends on the ratio between the use of his applied and his latent
talent.
Contrary to popular belief, there are gainers among those who are
“forced” to change their occupations. The sketch of the proof of this
proposition goes as follows.
Proof. First, let us show that there exist individuals who are indif-
ferent between sector X and sector Y in autarky, i.e. — with respect to
Fig. 8, this means those who are individuals right on the OA line. Under
autarky, those individuals receive equal occupational returns from sector
X and Y . Thus we can see, on the basis of Proposition 2, now even if
they start from sector Y and switch to sector X, they will inevitably be
winners from the price-change.
Second, let us show that there exist individuals who are indifferent
between switching to sector X and staying in sector Y after free trade —
i.e., the individuals on the OW line. Under free trade, those individuals
must have equal occupational returns between sector X and Y . There-
fore, regardless of whether they switched jobs or not, they are equally
lost, as job-stayers in a time of trade liberalization. (This too is derived
from the result in Proposition 2.)
Third, let us show that there exist individuals who are neither gain-
ers nor losers from trade liberalization — i.e., the individuals on the
OZ line. To do this, we must express the gain-loss as a function of τθ ,
the parameter of comparative advantage, and show that the function
is continuous across the domain of the function. Then we can use the
intermediate value theorem.
The gain-loss for a job-switcher can be expressed as Δπ(pA, pW , τ j , θj)
≡ πjX(pW , θj)− πjY (pA, τ j), where
207
v01
42 ?????? 456 ?
πjX(p
W , r, θj) =
[
pW
1
1−a
(
1
r(pW )
) a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)]
· θj =W · θj
and
πjY (p
A, r, τ j) =
[
pA
1
1−a
(
1
r(pA)
) a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)]
· τ j = A · τ j .
For the given values of K, pA, pW , the terms in the square brackets will
be constant. Therefore, the gain-loss function can be written as
Δπ =W · θj −A · τ j ,
where A and W are the corresponding constants. As for the percentage-
change of gain-loss, it will be
%Δπ
(
θj
τ j
)
=
Δπ
πjY
=
W · θj −A · τ j
A · τ j =
W · θj
A · τ j − 1 =
W
A ·
θj
τ j
− 1. (34)
Apparently, equation (34) is a continuous function of τθ . The value of the
percentage-change of gain-loss function %Δπ
(
θj
τj
)
is positive when the
value τθ equals the slope of the OA line, but negative when the value
τ
θ
equals the slope of the OW line. Since the function is continuous, we can
be sure there exists a value τθ that will give %Δπ = 0. This value equals
the slope OZ seen in Fig. 8. The size of gain or loss will be determined
by the relative size of the actually used and the latent talents.
While the gains and losses for job-stayers have the same properties
as those for specific-factor owners, the gains and losses for job-switchers
depend on the relative size of their actually-used and unused-latent tal-
ents. Therefore we can state the following result, with respect to the
limits on government policy.
Corollary 1 When the government can observe only the current (not
the past) profit, the calculation of gains and losses for job-stayers is an
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easy matter. The calculation of gains and losses among job-switchers,
however, becomes formidable.
The gains or losses for the job-staying individuals can be easily cal-
culated from Proposition 2. The difficulty of calculating the gains and
losses among the job-switchers may be seen from Fig. 8. In Fig. 8, look
at two points q and r. The individual q, as a producer for sector Y , has
a higher ability level than does the individual r. And yet as producers
for sector X, these two are equivalent. Still, the individual q belongs
to the group of losers, while the individual r belongs to the group of
gainers. While the government is able to observe the current profit of
X, it is not able to tell the difference between q and r because their
difference appears only with respect to their latent talents. Which of
them will gain and which of them will lose will depend upon the relative
strengths of their actually-used versus unused-latent talents. (For that
matter, the iso-percentage-gain lines would be the rays from origin, while
the iso-current-profit lines would be the verticals.)
What we have learned here is that the unobservability of latent tal-
ent makes it impossible for the government to distinguish gainers from
losers. And it is this impossibility which will prove such a nuisance to any
policymaker considering a Pareto-improving compensating redistribution
scheme. We defer our discussion of such a creation of the compensation
scheme, however, to section 6.
In the next section, section 5, we take a more detailed look at the
following example, in order to understand the results more clearly.
Example 1 Let us suppose that the parameter is a = 12 , and that the
distribution of the individuals is independently uniformly distributed
over a unit square. This would mean that its joint density can be written
as the following:
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f(θ, τ) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1 if (θ, τ) ∈ [0, 1]20 if (θ, τ) �∈ [0, 1]2
A quick note, before we proceed to the next section: the use of
specific coefficients aims for simplification. As I do not plan to look at
the comparative statics based on either a taste-change or a technology-
change, I choose instead to examine the specific case that simplifies the
algebraic manipulation. Thus, the implications of the model will not
hinge on the specific values of the parameter.
5. An Example of Unit-Square Uniform Distribution of
Talents
Let us begin with the domestic autarky equilibrium, with PX =
PY = 1 as the initial-equilibrium relative price. We will assume the
following change in the relative output price: PX = p �= 1 and PY = 1p ,
where p is a positive real number. Next, I utilize subscripts to indicate
the time-frame: ex ante is indicated by 0 and ex post by 1. Thus the
relative prices PXPY = P , in the two periods, are P0 = 1 and P1 = p
2.
Given our assumption as to there being a uniform distribution over
a unit square, the economy-wide employment of occupational factors can
be written as ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
V Rθ (p) =
⎧⎨⎩ 12 − 16p8 if p > 1p4
3 if 0 < p < 1
V Sτ (p) =
⎧⎨⎩ 13p4 if p > 11
2 − p
8
6 if 0 < p < 1.
The price of the generic factors will then be
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r0 =
1
2
√
K
�
2
3
and r1 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
√
K
�
p8+3
6p2 when p < 1
1
2
√
K
�
3p8+1
6p6 when p > 1.
The output of each agent in the two periods will be (respectively, on left
and on right)⎧⎨⎩ x
j
0 =
1
2r0
· θj , or
yj0 =
1
2r0
· τ j ,
and
⎧⎨⎩ x
j
1 =
p
2r1
· θj , or
yj1 =
1
2pr1
· τ j .
The rewards for the individuals from each occupation will be⎧⎨⎩ π
j
X0 =
1
4r0
· θj , or
πjY 0 =
1
4r0
· τ j ,
and
⎧⎨⎩ π
j
X1 =
p2
4r1
· θj , or
πjY 1 =
1
4p2r1
· τ j .
Thus we see that, in the initial equilibrium, the partition of the type-
space was derived from the division line of πjX0 = π
j
Y 0, hence, π
j = θj
(45-degree line).
In the new equilibrium the division line will be πj = p4θj — i.e., a
straight line from origin that has a steep slope if p > 1, a flatter slope if
p < 1.
Now the partition for the initial equilibrium can be written as⎧⎨⎩ R0 = {(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j ≤ θj}S0 = {(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j ≤ θj}.
The ex post equilibrium partition will be written as⎧⎨⎩ R1 = {(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j ≤ p4θj}S1 = {(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j ≤ p4θj}.
Next, let us define the finer partitions in the type-space that describe the
occupational choices across two time-periods. Let CX−X , CY−Y , CX−Y ,
and CY−X denote the following partitions:
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X producers in both periods: CX−X ≡ R0 ∩R1
Y producers in both periods: CY−Y ≡ S0 ∩ S1
Job-switchers form X to Y : CX−Y ≡ R0 ∩ S1
Job-switchers form Y to X: CY−X ≡ S0 ∩R1
What we note here is that the partitions CX−X and CY−Y are the
job-stayers, while CX−Y and CY−X are the job-switchers. It can also be
seen that the job-switchers exist in one direction given the price change:
CX−Y = ∅ when p > 1, and CY−X = ∅ when p < 1.?26?
5.1 Welfare Analysis of the Individuals in the Partition CX−X
Although ultimately the true welfare of the individuals will be mea-
sured by the total factor income, including the return on generic factors
as in equation (12). In the following analysis, we focus strictly on the oc-
cupational rewards . Thus, let us begin by denoting the welfare measure
from the change in relative output price ΔπjX ≡ πjX1−πjX0, since we can
then express this measure by the amount of the generic factor and by the
relative price:
ΔπjX =
�
p2
r1
− 1
r0
�
· θ
j
4
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
√
Kθj
2
��
6p6
p8+3 −
�
3
2
�
< 0 when p < 1
√
Kθj
2
��
6p10
3p8+1 −
�
3
2
�
> 0 when p > 1.
The individuals in the partition CX−X will be worse off when the
relative price of X becomes cheaper; i.e., when p < 1. They are better
off when the relative price becomes more expensive; i.e., when p > 1.
This result is consistent with the effect for the specific-factor owner in
the specific-factor (or Ricardo-Viner) model of trade. [See Jones (1971)
and Samuelson (1971).] And of course, this is a concrete example of
Proposition 2.
?26? We will omit the cumbersome case in which the relative price P changes across unit
price; e.g., when P0 < 1 and when P1 > 1.
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5.2 Welfare Analysis of the Individuals in the Partition CY−Y
Let us now look at the welfare effect for those who are in the par-
tition CY−Y , job-stayers in sector Y . Let Δπ
j
Y ≡ πjY 1 − πjY 0 denote
the welfare measure for these individuals. This measure can then be ex-
pressed strictly by the amount of the generic factor and by the relative
price:
ΔπjY =
�
1
p2r1
− 1
r0
�
· τ
j
4
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
√
Kτj
2
��
6
p2(p8+3) −
�
3
2
�
> 0 when p < 1
√
Kτj
2
��
6p2
3p8+1 −
�
3
2
�
< 0 when p > 1.
The individuals in partition CY−Y will be worse off when the relative
price of Y becomes cheaper — that is, when p > 1 — and conversely,
better off when it becomes more expensive, — that is, when p < 1.
Here too, as in the previous subsection, the result is consistent with
the specific-factors model of trade. Then too, all of these results are in
keeping with Proposition 2.
5.3 Welfare Analysis of the Individuals in the Partition CX−Y
Because there is no agent who will switch from sector X to sector Y
when the relative price is favorable to the production of X — i.e., when
p > 1, I will look only at the case in which p < 1. The situation of the
individuals in partition CX−Y can then be expressed by means of this
inequality:
CX−Y = {(θi, τ j) ∈ Θ : p4θj < τ j < θj}.
Whether job-switchers end up better off or worse off after changing their
occupation depend upon the sign of the expression ΔπjXY ≡ πjY 1 − πjX0:
ΔπjXY =
1
4
�
πj
p2r1
− θ
j
r0
�
=
√
K
2
��
6
p2(p8 + 3)
· τ j −
�
3
2
· θj
�
.
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Then, by simple algebraic manipulation, we arrive at the following:
ΔπjXY > 0 iff
�
6
p2(p8 + 3)
· τ j >
�
3
2
· θj ⇔ τ j >
�
p2(p8 + 3)
2
· θj .
Now, noting that p < 1, we are in a position to verify the following
inequalities:
1 >
�
p2(p8 + 3)
2
> p4.
Thus, we can conclude that there are individuals who become better off
after an occupation-change, and others who become worse off. Indeed,
on this basis, we can divide the job-switching individuals into distinct
two groups:⎧⎨⎩ Gainers : Δπ
j
XY > 0 iff θ
j > τ j >
√
p2(p8+3)
2 · θj
Losers : ΔπjXY < 0 iff
√
p2(p8+3)
2 · θj > τ j > p4θj
.
Let it be noted, furthermore, that the identification of gainers and
losers depends on a precise knowledge of any individual’s type (θj , τ j).
Such knowledge entails not only the absolute value of individual’s current
type, but also the relative sizes of θj and τ j . It is especially worthy of
note that the higher the comparative advantage in terms of production
of Y (new sector), the higher the value of τθ for the individual — all of
which means that the individual is likely to be among the gainers. This
result corresponds nicely with Proposition 3.
5.4 Welfare Analysis of the Individuals in the Partition CY−X
Let us now focus on the case in which p > 1. It is a particularly
interesting one, given that in the reverse case of p < 1, no one switches
from sector Y to sector X. Thus, the situation of the individuals in
partition CY−X can be expressed by means of the inequality
CY−X = {(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : p4θj > τ j > θj}.
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Now, let ΔπjY X ≡ πjX1 − πjY 0 denote the measure of welfare change for
the occupation-switchers who move from sector Y to sector X. We then
can see that
ΔπjY X =
1
4
�
p2θj
r1
− τ
j
r0
�
=
√
K
2
��
6p10
3p8 + 1
· θj −
�
3
2
· τ j
�
.
On that basis we are able to calculate the following:
ΔπjY X > 0 iff
�
6p10
3p8 + 1
· θj >
�
3
2
· τ j ⇔ τ j < 2p
5�
3p8 + 1
· θj .
Next, noting that p > 1, we can verify the following inequalities:
1 <
2p5�
3p8 + 1
< p4.
Thus, we can conclude that there are two types of individuals: those
who become better off after an occupation-change and those who become
worse off. More importantly, we can specify as follows the conditions of
the two groups:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
Gainers : ΔπjY X > 0 iff θ
j < τ j < 2p
5√
3p8+1
· θj
Losers : ΔπjY X < 0 iff
2p5√
3p8+1
· θj < τ j < p4θj .
Let it be noted as well that the identification of gainers and losers
depends on the precise knowledge of the type of the individual (θj , τ j),
and especially on the relative sizes of θj and τ j . And given that the
higher an individual’s comparative advantage is in the production of X
(new sector), the lower is his value of τθ , we see that he is likely to be
among the gainers. This result too is in keeping with Proposition 3.
This concludes our description of this particular example in which
the parameter is a = 12 and the distribution of the individuals is uniform
over a unit square.
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6. The Creation of Compensation Schemes
The results of the preceding analysis have shown us that there exist
both gainers and losers among those who switch their occupations. Now
that we have looked at the effect of a terms-of-trade change without com-
pensation, let us turn our attention to a government redistribution policy
that aims at both Pareto improvement (from opening up to trade) and
a balanced budget (in other words, the avoidance of overcompensation).
Now that we are looking at the creation of a compensation scheme
by the light of the informational structure of our model, we must begin
by comparing the two situations: autarky (prohibitive tariffs) and free
trade. The ex post situation should not necessary be the one of free trade.
It can be the one of some restricted trade, but for the sake of simplicity
we will focus on the autarky-versus-free-trade comparison.?27?The initial
equilibrium is the one in autarky. The uncompensated free-trade equilib-
rium was analyzed in sections 3 and 4. When the policymaker enacts a
compensation scheme, the free-trade equilibrium becomes a compensated
free-trade equilibrium.
In choosing the instruments of our compensation scheme, let us fol-
low the trend in the literature of avoiding the use of lump-sum compensa-
tion, owing to its formidable information requirement. [See, for example,
Feenstra and Lewis (1994, p. 202).] Therefore, we will examine a com-
pensation scheme which is based on factor taxes and commodity taxes
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, p. 20).?28? Let us now formally define the
compensation scheme.
Definition 1 The compensation scheme σ is a combination of taxes
?27? For the same reason, the ex ante situation could be one of some restricted trade.
?28? Of course, negative taxes are the same as positive subsidies. This notion of fac-
tor taxes and commodity taxes has been adopted from the standard public economics
textbook of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
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and subsidies levied on the following variables: (1) output prices, (2)
generic-factor prices, and (3) occupational rewards. Tax-subsidy rates
can either be linear or non-linear.
The taxes (or subsidies) on output prices are commodity taxes, and
the taxes on both generic-factor prices and occupational rewards are fac-
tor taxes. (In Dixit and Norman, “commodity taxes” embraces both
commodity and factor taxes, simply because they use a general approach
that does not distinguish outputs from inputs.) Following in the foot-
steps of Dixit and Norman (1986) and Feenstra and Lewis (1994), I too
adopt a two-stage compensation procedure. Because both Dixit-Norman
and Feenstra-Lewis aim to implement Pareto-improving compensation
schemes, the first stage of their schemes focuses on making everyone in
the economy as happy as they would be under autarky. To arrive at this
end, a policymaker must utilize both commodity taxes and factor taxes —
adding to these, in the case of Feenstra-Lewis, and relocation subsidies.
Both Dixit-Norman and Feenstra-Lewis proved that not only will the
government revenues from such first-stage schemes become non-negative,
but they will be redistributed back to individuals in the economy during
the second stage.
Definition 2 The compensation scheme σ can be implemented in two
stages: (1) In the first stage, the government tries to minimize the rents
that accrue to individual agents; in other words, it seeks to capture all
these rents in the form of positive revenue. Let us call this stage’s result
a σ1 equilibrium. (2) In the second stage, the government sends this
positive revenue back to the individual agents by means of either a poll
subsidy or a reduction of some commodity taxation. Let us call the result
of this second stage a σ2 equilibrium. This σ2 equilibrium can also be
called a σ equilibrium, since the result of the second stage is also the final
result of the whole compensation scheme.
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The purpose of the first stage is to ensure Pareto gains from trade by
setting as close as possible to an equilibrium in which all the individual
agents in the economy are as well off as they are in autarky. The first
stage may leave the government non-negative revenue (or strictly posi-
tive, if there exist strict production gains from trade). The second stage
tries to distribute back to individual agents the non-negative government
surplus from the first-stage equilibrium. This can be done either by poll
subsidy or by lowering consumption taxes (raising factor subsidies). Since
the technical requirements for the second-stage redistribution — notable
among these being the Weymark conditions — are closely examined in
the work by Dixit and Norman (1986), I take these results as given and
will not be discussing them in this paper. Our primary focus of analysis
will be on the first-stage equilibrium.
At this juncture I also would like to introduce several desirable and
undesirable properties of the compensation scheme. Its single most im-
portant property is related to the concept of ex post Pareto efficiency.
Definition 3 The compensation scheme σ is said to be weakly Pareto
improving if every individual is at least as well off as he or she was
under the autarky situation.
Formally, the requirement for the weak Pareto improvement is writ-
ten as a comparison of the welfare measure W of the individuals:
(W j)σ ≥ (W j)A, ∀j ∈ J, (35)
where the superscript σ means the individual’s welfare “in the situation
given the compensation scheme σ,” and A means the individual welfare
“in the autarky situation.” On both sides, W , a welfare measure, in-
dicates the real income of each individual in either situation, for in our
model real income represents the value of individual’s indirect utility
function. [See equation (15).]
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Another important property of the first-stage equilibrium is its rent
neutrality. A positive rent from a particular policy or environment change
is defined as an increase in the individual’s welfare from such change. It
is a premium or windfall profit, in the nature of Marshallian rents. As a
concrete example, if an inequality
(W j)σ > (W j)A (36)
holds true for some agent j, then we can see that this agent j has a
strictly positive rent of the value (W j)σ − (W j)A, given the policy-shift
from autarky to free trade under the compensation scheme σ. One of the
reasons the previous literature has adopted a two-stage compensation
procedure is the typical economist’s love of discussing efficiency without
getting into the discussion of equity issues. And indeed, we all would like
to keep any economic policy rent-neutral. In other words, we certainly
don’t want to see an arbitrary redistribution of wealth arising out of a
policy that has tried to target a different objective — in this case, the
policymaker’s objective of ensuring a Pareto improvement by opening his
nation up to trade.
We cannot say much about the second-stage redistribution of pos-
itive government revenues in this paper. We must simply content our-
selves with asserting, once again, that rent-neutrality is a desirable prop-
erty of any first-stage compensation equilibrium, as evidenced by the fact
that both Dixit-Norman and Feenstra-Lewis did attain rent-neutrality in
their respective first-stage equilibria. Let us now codify our definition of
risk-neutrality.
Definition 4 The first-stage compensation equilibrium σ1 is said to be
rent-neutral if every consumer is left at exactly the same utility level as
he or she was under autarky. In other words, all the positive rents shall
accrue as government revenues.
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We know that the original Dixit-Norman scheme’s first-stage equi-
librium is rent-neutral, because all the consumers face exactly the same
situation as they faced in autarky in the first stage. In Dixit and Nor-
man this scenario is arrived at by setting both the output and input
prices equal to the prices of the autarky. Fixing input prices at the au-
tarky level guarantees autarky-level incomes for the consumers. If we
were to fix our output prices at the autarky level, then the consumers
would be in exactly the same utility-maximizing situation as under au-
tarky, given that income and output prices are the only parameters in the
consumer’s program. The same observation holds true for the Feenstra-
Lewis scheme. The only difference is that, in their paper, the relocation
subsidies are given to some of the consumers to compensate them exactly
for that loss of income that arose out of the positive adjustment costs
associated with their movement of factors from one industry to another.
Under the assumptions of Feenstra and Lewis (1994), the government
can pick a minimum amount of relocation subsidy such that some of the
consumers are indifferent between moving and not moving to a new in-
dustry. Hence, the first-stage equilibrium in the Feenstra-Lewis scheme
is also rent-neutral.
As we shall later see in greater detail, the government in this paper’s
model is unable to create the rent-neutral first-stage equilibrium. In
order to achieve Pareto improvement from autarky, it is necessary for the
government to give positive rents to some groups of individual agents.
For our present purpose, we will be calling this undesirable property
overcompensation.
Definition 5 A scheme is said to overcompensate a group of individ-
uals if some within that group are getting positive rents in the first-stage
compensation equilibrium σ1.
Note that the definitions we have arrived at of overcompensation
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and rent-neutrality are two sides of the same coin. When the scheme
is rent-neutral, it is not overcompensating any group of consumers; and
by reverse token, when the scheme is overcompensating some group, it
cannot be rent-neutral. We can, however, specifically identify the group
for which positive rents are accruing, in accordance with our definition
of overcompensation.
The other important property of the compensation scheme concerns
the budget of the government.
Definition 6 The compensation scheme σ is said to be self-financing
if it leaves non-negative government revenue in the first-stage equilibrium
σ1:
Bσ1 ≥ 0, (37)
where Bσ1 is a net government balance from only the first-stage equi-
librium of the scheme; i.e., the revenue from taxes minus the cost of
subsidies.
This definition of a self-financing scheme has been adopted from the
definition of self-financing tariffs that was introduced by Ohyama (1972,
p. 49). A compensation scheme containing taxes and subsidies on various
economic variables is said to be self-financing if the government is able
to balance the budget strictly from the net revenue earned within the
scheme.
The procedure of implementing a compensation scheme that we will
be considering here is similar to the ones considered in Dixit and Nor-
man (1986) and Feenstra and Lewis (1994). It boils down to these two
aspects. (1) A system of subsidy and taxation that leaves every con-
sumer of the economy in the same situation as autarky, and this policy
may accrue positive revenues for the government. (2) If there are some
positive revenues, the government will redistribute these back to the in-
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dividuals. It will do the latter via either a poll subsidy for everyone or an
adjustment of the tax or subsidy. The latter is possible because, in the
trading economy presumed here, the Weymark condition?29?of Dixit and
Norman (1986) is automatically satisfied. When we discuss the compen-
sation scheme, our focus will be on the first step of creating a system of
subsidy and taxation that aims to leave all the consumers at least as well
off as they were under the autarky. As for the actual implementation of
the second step, this is already fully discussed in the literature.
Another important property of any compensation scheme is its fea-
sibility. Despite the fact that much of the literature discusses the con-
cept of “feasibility” in terms of non-negativity of governmental budgets
(self-financing), this paper separates the governmental budget issues (dis-
cussed above) from the issues associated with the feasibility of a com-
pensation scheme. In this paper, feasibility occurs when the policy in-
struments of the government are based on the observable variables.
Definition 7 A scheme σ is said to be feasible if it is based solely on
the currently observable variables.
This definition of feasibility is based on the observability of the vari-
ables by the government. But what are the observable variables? And
which characteristics of the individuals are observable to the policymak-
ers? I propose the following realistic, three-step assumption about ob-
servability: (1) The government keeps track of aggregate variables in
record. (2) Therefore, it remembers the sizes of aggregate variables in
the autarky situation. (3) The individual data can be observed at no
cost only in the current situation.
?29? The Weymark condition tells us that there exists one good for which some consumers
are net buyers and none is a net seller. In the traditional trade model, in which consumers
are net sellers of factors of production and net buyers of consumer output goods, the
condition will automatically be satisfied.
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This assumption makes sense, because while most aggregate data
is available in various forms, it is very difficult to go back and find a
past data-point that is specific to a particular individual. For example,
the bulk of the income tax rate will be determined by the current year’s
income, and yet the tax rate does not usually depend upon the accumu-
lation of multi-year income, including previous years’ incomes.?30?Thus,
individual data in the autarky period are presumed to be costly to verify,
in the free-trade period.
Let us suppose that the government can observe the following vari-
ables: Y1 ∼ Y5 where Y stands for Yes.
Y1 Output prices PX , PY (both at the autarky and the free-trade lev-
els)
Y2 Generic-factor prices r (both at the autarky and the free-trade lev-
els)
Y3 Residual return (profit) from the individual’s current (free-trade)
occupation
Also, we shall suppose that the government is able to observe these
two characteristics of individuals:
Y4 Which industry the individual is currently working in.
Y5 Whether the individual has changed his or her occupation.
Let us further suppose that the government cannot observe the fol-
lowings variables: N1 ∼ N4 where N stands for No.
N1 Individual consumption vector
?30? This is indeed the lack of cumulative-profit-tax system of which Columbia’s late
William Vickrey had been a proponent ever since the 1940s.
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N2 Individual generic-factor endowment
N3 Individual occupational-ability vector
N4 Residual return (profit) from the individual’s previous (autarky)
occupation
Most of the above assumptions about observability are standard in
the literature. [See for example Guesnerie (1995).]
Given the assumption about observability of profit, the following
result will be utilized in the ensuing analysis.
Result 1 Given the production setup of the model, and given that the
government can observe the residual profits of individuals, the profit tax
will not distort their behaviors. In other words, the individuals will maxi-
mize their profits truthfully, given that the elasticity of the after-tax (sub-
sidy) share, with respect to the profit, is larger than −1. Formally, they
will do so whenever
ε =
∂T/T
∂π/π
> −1, (38)
where T (π) = 1 − t(π), where π is the residual profit, and where t(π) is
an ad valorem tax rate (or if t(π) is negative, a subsidy rate).
Please see the Appendix for the proof. Note also that the linear tax
has an elasticity of ε = 0, and thus satisfies condition (38). Also, given
that the individual agents are assumed to be acting truthfully, we can
conclude that their current use of their talents is revealing.
Remark 1 Given the previous observation in Result 1 as to the truth-
fully maximized current levels of individuals’ residual returns, the gov-
ernment can recalculate the size of θ for X-producers, and of τ for Y -
producers. The planner can infer the size of the actual use of talent, as
opposed to an agent’s endowment of latent talent.
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This is straightforward. If policymakers can condition their policy
on the current profit, then either⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
πjX(PX , r, θ
j) =
�
(PX)
1
1−a � 1
r
� a
1−a
�
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
��
· θj , or
πjY (PY , r, τ
j) =
�
(PY )
1
1−a � 1
r
� a
1−a
�
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
��
· τ j .
given the observability of such aggregate variables as the output prices
PX , PY and the generic-factor-return r, the inversion of profit to type
is a simple calculation. One might also say that the profit is a strictly
increasing function of the size of the type, in which case any tax-subsidy
rate that is proportional to the observed profit could be used, almost as
if the government were observing the type itself.
Now that we have defined all the necessary properties of the com-
pensation scheme and looked at all the relevant results, we can proceed to
examine the results of the possible compensation schemes. In order to do
so we will investigate two distinctive cases with respect to the timing of
implementation. In the first case, called an unanticipated compensation
scheme, the trade openings are implemented prior to the announcement
that the government will compensate the losers from trade. In the second
case, called an anticipated compensation scheme, all the individual agents
expect the compensation scheme to be provided later by the government,
after the economy opened up its borders. In the following section we be-
gin to look at the first such case.
7. An Unanticipated Compensation Scheme
Despite the tradition stipulating that a regular lump-sum compensa-
tion must be given prior to opening up to trade [or opening the market]
(Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 328), a more plausible and realistic policy
option must include a “post-trade compensation scheme” (Kemp and
225
v01
60 ?????? 456 ?
Wan 1986, p. 99) whereby the government first opens the border, then
creates the compensation scheme in order to assist the losers from trade.
In fact, I claim that this sort of unanticipated compensation scheme is
pretty much what we saw occurring back in the 1960s. For in response to
the Kennedy round of GATT multilateral tariff reductions, the United
States government introduced the first TAA (trade adjustment assis-
tance) program, in order to accommodate the high number of workers
displaced by the tariff reduction.
In this section we explore a possible unanticipated post-trade com-
pensation policy, given the informational restriction on the economy that
we have posited in this paper. I will postpone to the next section both an
examination of the case in which the individuals anticipate the existence
of the compensation scheme, and an analysis of the way this anticipation
alters individual incentives.
Whenever one goes in search of the optimal compensating/redistri-
buting scheme, the most important criterion to be kept in mind is Pareto
improvement from autarky. At the same time, in pursuing the creation
of such a scheme, the policymaker must always be aware of the feasi-
bility constraint, given the limited observability of the unused talents of
individual agents. When the scheme comprises two stages, the policy-
maker tries to accrue all the rents in the form of governmental revenues
in the first stage. Thus the ideal first-stage equilibrium is rent-neutral.
Owing to the feasibility constraint, however, this paper’s model does not
posit any achievement of rent-neutrality in the first-stage equilibrium.
That said, let us begin to explore the process of creating a compensating
scheme.
For analytic convenience, we focus on the case in which the price-
change occurs in one direction (the other case being completely symmet-
ric). More specifically, this is the case in which the post-trade price is
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p > pA, and therefore there are job-switchers from sector Y to sector
X. Given the setup of our model, as described back in Section 3, we are
cognizant of the following five cases (Case I - Case V) with respect to the
gains and losses for different groups of individuals:
Case I. Generic-factor owners are all gainers, since r(p) > r(pA). More
particularly, the amount of gain for those who own Kj is given
by (
r(p)− r(pA)) ·Kj =
a ·K−(1−a) ·
{
[s(p)]
1−a − [s(pA)]1−a} ·Kj > 0, (39)
where
s(p) = p
1
1−a · V Rθ (p) + p−
1
1−a · V Sτ (p). (40)
Note that this group’s amount of gain from trade is proportional
to the agent’s endowment of generic factor Kj . The multiplier
part,
a ·K−(1−a) ·
{
[s(p)]
1−a − [s(pA)]1−a} ,
is invariable across all agents. Both a and K are the param-
eters of the model. Given the relative price change pA =⇒ p,
the values for both s(pA) and s(p) are determined in the ag-
gregate equilibrium. Because the policymaker knows the joint
distribution of the talent vector (θ, τ ), he also knows the values
of V Rθ (p) and V
S
τ (p) and hence of s(p) and s(p
A). Thus, by
imposing on the market for generic factors an ad valorem tax
rate of
tr(p) =
[s(p)]
1−a − [s(pA)]1−a
[s(p)]
1−a , (41)
the policymaker can make the status of all the owners of generic
factors the same as it was under autarky in the first-stage equi-
librium.
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Case II. The job-staying individuals in sector X — those who are in the
area τ < (pA)
2
1−a
θ — are all gainers, since πjX1(p) > π
j
X0(p
A)
when p > pA. More particularly, the amount of gain for those
who have talent θj is given by
πjX1(p)− πjX0(pA) =
Ka(1−a) ·
(
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a−pA
1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a) · θj> 0,
(42)
where the definition of s(p) is the same as it was in equation
(40). Much the same as in Case I, the amount of gain from
trade, for the group of job-staying individuals in sector X, is
proportional to the agent’s endowment of used talent θj . The
multiplier part,
Ka(1− a) ·
(
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a − pA
1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a)
,
is invariable across all of these agents. Thus, by imposing upon
the return-from-talent of job-stayers of sector X an ad valorem
tax rate of
tπX =
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a − pA
1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a
p
1
1−a [s(p)]
−a
, (43)
the policymaker can make the status of these individuals the
same as it was under autarky in the first-stage equilibrium.
Case III. Among the job-switching individuals, a part of them— all those
who are in the area (pA)
2
1−a
θj < τ j < WA · θj — are gainers,
since πjX1(p) > π
j
Y 0(p
A) when p > pA. More particularly, the
amount of gain for those who have the talent-vector (θj , τ j) is
given by
πjX1(p)− πjY 0(pA) =W · θj −A · τ j > 0, (44)
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where
W = p
1
1−a
(
1
r(p)
) a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)
and where
A = pA
1
1−a
(
1
r(pA)
) a
1−a
(
a
a
1−a − a
1
1−a
)
.
Contrary to Cases I and II, the amount of gain for the job-
switching individuals is no longer proportional to their endow-
ments of used talent θj . It is true that both W and A are in-
variable across all these individuals, and that the policymaker
can calculate the values for W and A, but the amount of gain,
W · θj − A · τ j , depends upon both elements of the talent-
vector (θj , τ j), which itself is unobservable to the policymaker.
Of course the policymaker could always recalculate the value
of used talent θj based on his observations of the profits that
have accrued from production of X. The value of τ j , how-
ever, is unknown to the policymaker. To help us all see this in
a more concrete manner, let us now suppose that the policy-
maker would like to impose an ad valorem tax rate of
tπX−Y =
W · θj −A · τ j
W · θj = 1−
A · τ j
W · θj , (45)
in order to make all of these Case III individuals as happy
as they were back in the autarky. The actual tax rate that
the policymaker can impose, however, should be in the form
of tπX−Y (πX(θ)), meaning that it should be based only on the
currently observable πX(θ), which will in turn depend upon the
current use of talent θ.
Case IV. The other part of the job-switching individuals — who are in
the area WA · θj < τ j < p
2
1−a
θj — are all losers since πjX1(p) <
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πjY 0(p
A) when p > pA. More particularly, the amount of loss
for those who have talent (θj , τ j) is given by
−
(
πjX1(p)− πjY 0(pA)
)
= A · τ j −W · θj > 0. (46)
This case is quite similar to Case III, when it comes to both
the amount of loss for each individual and the subsidy rate.
The infeasible subsidy rate that the policymaker would like to
impose on this group is
sπX−Y =
A · τ j −W · θj
W · θj =
A · τ j
W · θj − 1, (47)
whereas the feasible subsidy rate must of course be in the form
of sπX−Y (πX(θ)).
Case V. The job-staying individuals in sector Y — those who are in the
area p
2
1−a
θ < τ — are all losers, since πjY 1(p) < π
j
Y 0(p
A) when
p > pA. More particularly, the amount of loss for those who
have talent τ j is given by
−
(
πjY 1(p)− πjY 0(pA)
)
=
Ka(1− a) ·
(
pA
−1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a − p −11−a [s(p)]−a) · τ j > 0.
(48)
Similarly to Cases I and II, the amount of gain from trade
for sector Y ’s job-staying individuals is proportional to their
endowments of used talent τ j . The multiplier part,
Ka(1− a) ·
(
pA
−1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a − p −11−a [s(p)]−a) ,
is invariable across all of these agents. Thus, by imposing on the
return-from-talent of the sector Y ’s job-stayers an ad valorem
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subsidy rate of
sπY =
pA
−1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a − p −11−a [s(p)]−a
p
−1
1−a [s(p)]
−a
, (49)
the policymaker can make the status of all the job-staying in-
dividuals in sector Y the same as it was under autarky in the
first-stage equilibrium.
It is always instructive to look at a first-best case, even if in reality
it is impossible to implement such a scheme. Thus let us now posit the
following first-best scheme:
Scheme 1 As a first-stage equilibrium, tax the winning groups (Cases
I,II, and III) and subsidize the losing groups (Cases IV and V) in amounts
equal to their gains and losses, so that every individual is in the same sit-
uation as he or she was back in autarky. Such tax and subsidy rates have
been well expressed by our equations (41), (43), (45), (47), and (49).
If we could implement this fictitious first-best case, we would have
a rent-neutral scheme. But while the taxation and subsidy schemes for
Cases I,II, and V are feasible, the determination of the tax and subsidy
rates for the job-switchers, Cases III and IV, must be based on a combi-
nation of observable and unobservable variables. The government cannot
distinguish between the Cases III and IV groups because it cannot ob-
serve the relative size of (θj , τ j) for each individual. The policymaker
can observe only the profit that is accruing from current production, and
thus can observe, in this case of p > pA, only the profit from sector-X-
production. The policymaker cannot observe (or condition his taxation
scheme on) the counter-factual profit from sector Y that is proportional
to the agent’s unused latent talent τ . In terms of Fig. 8, for instance,
this means that there is no way for the government to distinguish the
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points q and r, because in the equilibrium the individuals at both q and
r earn the same profit and produce the same amount of product X. All
of which leads us to the following result.
Proposition 4 Given the setup of the model in this paper, if the govern-
ment is aiming to achieve a Pareto improvement from autarky, there
is no feasible first-stage compensated equilibrium that is rent-neutral.
By consulting our equations (39), (42), and (48), which depict the
gains and losses for the various groups of individuals, we are able to
establish the taxation and subsidy rates for, and to make as happy as
they were back in autarky, these three groups of individuals: (a) generic-
factor-K owners at the rate (41); (b) sector-X job-stayers at the rate
(43); and (c) sector-Y job-stayers at the rate (49). We can do this because
these individuals’ gains and losses are proportional to their factor-returns
(both their residual-profits and generic-factor returns), and thus also
proportional to the sizes of their actually employed talents (or factor
endowments). In this case, all we need to do is simply setup a linear tax
or subsidy system. (We recall, from Result 1 in section 6, that any linear
tax-subsidy system is incentive compatible.)
As we shift our focus now to the job-switching individuals, we find
that things are not so easy. Look at equations (44) and (46), showing that
the amount of an individual’s gain or loss depends on the relative size
of his actually used talent θ and his unused latent talent τ . Because the
policymaker does not have access to each individual’s data — history of
profits and losses — he can only base the taxation-subsidy scheme on the
currently observable variables. In this case, the current profit from sector-
X production is observable. In effect, the policymaker can observe θ, but
not τ . (The policymaker observes the profits of the individual agents. If
a profit is reported truthfully, the policymaker can recalculate the size
of the used talent. See Remark 1 in section 6.) Thus, the policymaker
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cannot make all the job-switching individuals exactly as happy as they
were under autarky, with the exception of one border case that we will
be looking at shortly. Given all of this, we conclude the following.
Proposition 5 Given the setup of the model in this paper, if the govern-
ment is aiming to achieve a Pareto improvement from autarky, the
feasible sort of post-trade compensation policy must overcompensate
the group of job-switching individuals in its first-stage equilibrium.
If the policymaker’s most pressing concern is to ensure a Pareto
improvement over the autarky, then the feasible scheme must overcom-
pensate the job-switching individuals. The preceding points have taught
us that the policymaker can tax and subsidize job-stayers in the rent-
neutral manner, but cannot do so for the job-switchers simply because
in their case he can observe only θ, not τ .
Let us go back for a moment to Fig. 7, in which we posit the unit-
square support for the joint distribution of talents. The left-hand side of
the figure contains the lines that represent a same percentage-change of
gain or loss from trade. The right-hand side contains the lines indicating
that those individuals who are making the same amount of residual profit.
The iso-percentage gain-loss lines are the rays from origin, and the iso-
current profit lines for X producers are the parallel vertical lines.
While this first-best first-stage scheme requires that there be a linear
taxation-subsidy system imposed along the iso-percentage gain-loss lines,
the policymaker can observe only the differences among individuals along
the iso-current profit lines. This is because the job-switching individuals
appear to be the same when they are earning the same amount of profit,
and hence show up on the same iso-current profit line.
Among those who are earning the same profit, it is the individual
on the upper bound of the iso-current profit line who has gained the
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smallest (lost the largest) amount from trade. Since the policymaker
cannot distinguish among the individuals on the same iso-profit line, he
must compensate all the individuals on the same profit line at the same
level as the least lucky individual who is on the upper bound of that line.
And yet, apart from that least happy individual exactly on the upper
bound, those who received the same amounts of compensation dispensed
by the policymaker must carry positive rents, since their iso-percentage
gain-loss lines are higher than that of the upper-bound individual.
Looking again at the two points q and r in Fig. 7, we see that they
are on the same iso current-profit line. Thus they appear to be the same
from the policymaker’s view point, and yet one of them, q, is a loser
while the other, r, is a gainer. Still, the amount of compensation must
be the same for both points q and r. Even if the individual at r is in fact
a gainer, he must be receiving the same amount of subsidy (as oppose to
paying any tax) as the individual at point q. The point again being that
the government which aims for a Pareto improvement will unavoidably
overcompensate the job-switching individuals.
To help us to see this in a more concrete manner, let us define the
iso current-profit set ICP (θ∗).
Definition 8 The iso current-profit set ICP (θ∗) is the set of all those
job-switching individuals who have the same size of talent θ∗:
ICP (θ∗) ≡ {(θj , τ j) ∈ CY−X : θj = θ∗} ,
where CY−X is a partition of job-switchers; i.e.,
CY−X ≡
{
(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : (pA)
2
1−a
θ < τ j < p
2
1−a
θ
}
.
Note that ICP (θ∗) is a linear, one-dimensional subspace of R2. Let
τ(θ∗) be the lower bound for the value of the element τ in a set ICP (θ∗),
and let τ(θ∗) be the upper bound for the same subspace. Note that τ(θ∗)
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is always equal to (pA)
2
1−a
θ∗, whereas τ(θ∗) depends on the size of θ∗.
In particular,
τ(θ∗) = sup
{
p
2
1−a
θ∗,Θτ (θ∗)
}
,
where Θτ (θ∗) is a upper bound for the element τ in the whole Θ space
when θj = θ∗. In the case of a unit-square support for the joint distri-
bution, Θτ (θ∗) = 1.
Because all of the individuals in the set ICP (θ∗) are the job-switchers
from sector Y to sector X, they are currently producing output X. And
since all the members of the set ICP (θ∗) have the same size of talent
θ∗, their profit will be the same: πjX(p, r(p), θ
∗). Their individual gains
or losses, however, will be different because they have different sizes of
the latent talent τ . By working out of (44) and (46), we find that the
amount of individual gains or losses can be expressed as
∣∣W · θ∗ −A · τ j∣∣.
Whether the individual j (who has the talent θ∗) gains or loses, and how
much he gains or loses, will depend upon the size of τ j . But among those
who belong to the set ICP (θ∗) there are all spectra of the individuals who
have the latent talent τ in the interval
[
τ(θ∗), τ(θ∗)
]
. The policymaker,
however, cannot distinguish among them.
If the policymaker would like to ensure Pareto gains from trade,
he must be sure he makes the least happy individual as happy as he
was back in the autarky. Note also that this least happy individual
must have had the largest talent in the previous sector Y , and hence
have been the one with the largest latent talent τ(θ∗). Therefore, for
all individuals (θ∗, τ) ∈ ICP (θ∗), the amount of subsidy or tax must be∣∣∣W · θ∗ −A · τ(θ∗)∣∣∣. The ad valorem rate for any individual having the
profit π(θ∗) would then be
tπX−Y (π(θ∗)) =
∣∣∣∣∣W · θ∗ −A · τ(θ∗)W · θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ . (50)
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If W · θ∗ − A · τ(θ∗) > 0, equation (50) represents a tax rate. If W ·
θ∗ − A · τ(θ∗) < 0, it represents a subsidy rate. With the exception of
the individual at the point (θ∗, τ(θ∗)), which is measure zero, all of the
individuals in the set ICP (θ∗) are going to get overcompensated, since
the inequality
W · θ∗ −A · τ(θ∗) <W · θ∗ −A · τ (51)
must hold for all those having the latent talent τ ∈
[
τ(θ∗), τ(θ∗)
)
.
From (51), we can see that∫ τ(θ∗)
τ(θ∗)
{
W · θ∗ −A · τ(θ∗)
}
f(θ∗, τ)dτ
<
∫ τ(θ∗)
τ(θ∗)
{W · θ∗ −A · τ} f(θ∗, τ)dτ.
Then we also can integrate over all the job-switching individuals, thus,∫
CY−X
∫ τ(θ∗)
τ(θ∗)
{
W · θ∗ −A · τ(θ∗)
}
f(θ, τ)dτdθ∗
<
∫
CY−X
∫ τ(θ∗)
τ(θ∗)
{W · θ∗ −A · τ} f(θ, τ)dτdθ∗, (52)
with the integration over θ∗ being done for all the job-switching individu-
als. The difference between the right- and left-hand sides of the inequal-
ity (52) is the total amount of overcompensation for the job-switching
individuals.
Given the preceding overcompensation results, we can go on to state
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 A feasible post-trade compensation policy that achieves
weak Pareto improvement may or may not be self-financing, de-
pending upon the joint distribution of the individuals’ talents.
236
v01
Occupational Choice and Compensation for Losers from International Trade 71
According to both Dixit and Norman (1980) and Ohyama (1972),
a Pareto-improving compensation scheme will be self-financing so long
as the aggregate consumption possibilities set is larger than the one un-
der autarky, if we allow for a lump-sum transfer. In this model, however,
when we impose the feasibility condition, a compensation scheme without
a lump-sum transfer may or may not be self-financing. This is because
overcompensating the job-switching individuals may absorb the positive
aggregate rents the economy has seen owing to an opening up to trade.
Whether the amount of overcompensation is large will depend upon the
shape of the joint distribution of talents. In particular, if the total mass
of job-switching individuals is large, then the total amount of overcom-
pensation will be large as well. We can then find parameter values such
that the total compensation scheme will not be self-financing.
Let us now look at an example where the support of joint distri-
bution is a unit square. Figure 9 illustrates the scheme for this case.
For this unit-square case, we introduce a different, finer separation of the
partition CY−X into two groups: a group of absolute gainers and a group
combining gainers and losers — based only on the observable variables.
Fig. 9 The feasible post-trade compensation scheme.
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To help us make this matter more concrete, consider the following:
(i) Generic-factor owners; same as Case I.
(ii) All of the individuals in partition CXX ; same as Case II.
(iii) Those individuals in partition CY X who meet the condition θ >
A
W .
(iv) Those individuals in partition CY X who meet the condition θ <
A
W .
(v) All of the individuals in partition CY Y ; same as Case V.
Note that in Fig. 9, the dotted line OZ stands for the gain-zero line:
θ = AW ·τ . This categorization uses only the observable variables, because
the distinction between the partition (iii) and the partition (iv) is based
solely on θ, which can be recalculated by looking at the current profits of
the individuals. Given this new categorization, let us propose a revised
post-trade compensation scheme.
Scheme 2 As a first-stage equilibrium, tax (i), (ii), (iii) and subsidize
(iv) and (v). Note in particular that the tax and subsidy rates are as
expressed in the equations: (41) for (i), (43) for (ii), (50) for groups
(iii) and (iv), and (49) for (v).
This scheme is all done with the observable variables. Thus, it is
feasible. And yet it is only a second-best, because the groups (iii) and
(iv) bring us into overcompensation. This is inevitable, given that we
have no way to distinguish among the gainers and losers in this category.
In order to find the appropriate tax-subsidy rate, let us seek both
the minimum subsidy rate and the maximum tax rate for each group
that satisfies the weak-Pareto-improvement requirement shown in (35).
Because the model in this paper uses the price normalization that assures
us that the nominal income is equal to the real income, we can easily find
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the tax-subsidy rate for all the groups that makes everyone as well-off as
they were back in the autarky. Note that the tax-subsidy base must be
the observable variable or the variable that is easily recalculated. Thus
the nature of the tax-subsidy for each group will be:
(i) (Linear) factor (commodity) tax on the generic factors.
(ii) (Linear) profit tax on the occupation-rewards for the job-staying
producers of output X.
(iii) (Nonlinear) profit tax on the occupation-rewards for the job-switching
producers of output X.
(iv) (Nonlinear) profit subsidy on the occupation-rewards for the job-
switching producers of output X.
(v) (Linear) profit subsidy on the occupation-rewards for the job-staying
producers of output Y .
The linear factor tax for generic-factor owners is the same as the
one we saw in the first best case. Now we would like to focus on the
individual heterogeneity of talents. Based on the above categorization,
let us denote the partitions of the ability vector space in a finer way:
1. CX−X ≡
�
(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : τ j < (pA)
2
1−a
θj
�
2. H = CHY−X
≡
�
(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : p
2
1−a
θ > τ j > (pA)
2
1−a
θj and 1 > WA · θj
�
3. M = CMY−X
≡
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : p
2
1−a
θ > τ j > (pA)
2
1−a
θj and 1(
p
2
1−a
) < θj < AW
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
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4. L = CLY−X
≡
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : p
2
1−a
θ > τ j > (pA)
2
1−a
θj and 0 < θj < 1(
p
2
1−a
)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
5. CY−Y ≡
�
(θj , τ j) ∈ Θ : p
2
1−a
θ < τ j
�
The job-stayer groups CX−X and CY−Y will face the same linear
tax-subsidy scheme as we saw in the first-best case. Thus, our focus
here will be on the groups of job-switchers, H, M and L, all of whom
are currently producing the output X. Because the government cannot
distinguish among those earn the same profit from their production of
X, the policymaker must take from (give to) each individual as little tax
(large subsidy) as the least gainer (worst loser) among those who earn
the same profit. For a given profit-level, the least gainers are those who
possess the largest latent ability to make Y product. For the groupH and
M , the least gainers (largest losers) are the individuals with τ(θ∗) = 1.
For the group L, they are τ(θ∗) = p
2
1−a
θ∗.
Next, we must effectively check the optimal tax rate for those who
have an ability vector (θ∗, 1) where 1 ≥ θ∗ > 1(
p
2
1−a
) , and the optimal
tax rate for those with a vector
�
θ∗, p
2
1−a
θ∗
�
where 0 < θ∗ < 1(
p
2
1−a
) .
Thus, the individuals in the group H who earn π(θ∗) will have imposed
upon them a tax rate of
tH(π(θ
∗)) =
W · θ∗ −A
W · θ∗ − δ(θ
∗),
while the individuals in group M who earn π(θ∗) will be given a subsidy
at the rate of
sM (π(θ
∗)) =
A−W · θ∗
W · θ∗ + δ(θ
∗),
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where δ(θ∗) > 0 represents an arbitrary, very small number that has a
property of δ�(θ∗) > 0. The purpose of this additional small term is to
avoid breaching the condition ε = ∂T/T∂π/π > −1, arrived at Result 1 in the
previous section. Without this term δ(θ∗), the condition must inevitably
become ε = −1. (For the formal proof, see the Appendix.) The group-L
individuals will face the linear subsidy rate:
sL =
A · p
2
1−a
θ∗−W · θ∗
W · θ∗ =
A · p
2
1−a−W
W .
This completes the description of the tax-subsidy scheme for the first-
stage equilibrium in the unit-square case.
8. An Anticipated Compensation Scheme
In the previous section, our compensation program was enacted after
trade openings. The introduction of the program is assumed to have been
a surprising (unpredicted) one. It may indeed be rather close to what
actually occurred in the 1960s, and yet such an analysis still may not
describe at all well the more recent situations. Once a compensation
scheme is in place, the individual agents start taking its very existence
into account. They change their behaviors simply because the existence
of the program alters their incentives.?31? In this section we analyze what
we shall call an anticipated compensation scheme.
We begin by looking at the situation in which individual agents ex-
pect the compensation program to exist, and behave accordingly. In the
?31? The argument here is analogous to the Friedman-Phelps hypothesis of the natural
rate of unemployment. If policymakers try to take advantage of the Phillips curve by
choosing higher inflation in order to reduce unemployment, they will succeed in reducing
unemployment only temporarily. Several years of a high inflation rate will shift the
augmented Phillips curve upward, because people’s expected level of inflation rate at
the natural rate of unemployment will also rise. Thus, policymakers must wait for a
long time before they can take advantage of surprise inflation. By a similar logic, the
policymaker cannot take advantage of an unanticipated compensation scheme for a long
time.
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previous section, we saw some agents switch their occupations before
they know whether there would be a compensation scheme. In this sec-
tion we posit that some of the individual agents who had changed their
jobs under that scenario [without compensation] may not switch their
occupations if they expect a compensating subsidy that will be given
only when they stay in their declining industry. This is inevitable, since
any compensation scheme must specify the tax and subsidy rates not
just for job-switchers but for job-stayers as well. When job-stayers stay
in their own industry, policymakers cannot tell if they are the counter-
factual job-switchers. Indeed, there would be no way for us to tell which
agents among the job-stayers have changed their jobs, were it not for the
compensation scheme. Noting this difficulty/complication, let us turn to
the creation of an anticipated compensation scheme.
We adopt the same strategy as before. In the first-stage equilibrium,
the policymaker will try to make agents as happy as or happier than they
were back in the autarky situation.?32?We try to generate non-negative
revenues for the government, which later the policymaker can redistribute
back to all agents in the second stage. Let us first announce the following
tax scheme for the producers of X under autarky.
1. For those who stay in X industry, there will be a linear tax rate of
tant =
πjX1 − πjX0
πjX1
=
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a − pA
1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a
p
1
1−a [s(p)]
−a
.
This tax-rate can make the job-stayers in X indifferent from the
autarky situation.
2. For those who switch from X to Y industry, there will be a linear
tax rate of
?32? We may have to provide some positive surplus, for informational reasons.
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t∗ant >
πjX1 − πjY 0
πjX1
=
p
1
1−a
[s(p)]
−a − pA
−1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a
p
1
1−a [s(p)]
−a
.
In reality, there will be no job-switchers in this direction, given the
change in terms-of-trade.
Thus, all the members of CX−X will stay in X industry, and all must
pay the amount of tax that makes them indifferent from the autarky
situation. No one will switch from X to Y , since paying tax at the rate
t∗ant makes no sense.
Now, in order to make sure that those in group CY−Y are at least as
well off as they were in the autarky situation, we announce the following
subsidy scheme for the producers of Y in autarky.
3. If any Y -producer in autarky chooses to stay in sector-Y -production
after the opening up to trade, the government will provide him or
her a positive subsidy — one that is proportional to his or her
occupational return in Y production. The linear subsidy rate will
be
sant =
πjY 0 − πjY 1
πjY 1
=
pA
−1
1−a [
s(pA)
]−a − p −11−a [s(p)]−a
p
−1
1−a [s(p)]
−a
.
This offer by the government will surely guarantee that no one
is made worse off by the opening up to free trade, for the autarky
producers of Y now have the option of staying in the same industry,
with the same return as before.
The government is left to specify the tax-subsidy scheme for those
who switch from sector Y to sector X — namely, the group CY−X . Now,
in order to make our analysis a more concrete one, let us look at Fig. 10,
which shows a case of unit-square support.
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Fig. 10 An ex ante compensation scheme with its partitions.
We now can divide the unit-square into five partitions. With the
exception of the natural job-stayers — the groups CX−X and CY−Y
— there are three new groups among the counter-factual job-switchers:
(1) D, comprising the individuals who were job-switchers, under free
trade but who will stay in industry Y ; (2) L, comprising those who
were winning job-switchers under free trade but whose current profits
are indistinguishable from those of the losing job-switchers; and (3) H,
comprising those who were winning job-switchers under free trade and
whose current profits must surely be larger than those of the losing job-
switchers.
With respect to the group D, the government cannot do anything
better than it did by implementing the above subsidy scheme, targeting
industry-Y -stayers. As long as the latter decide to stay in sector Y , they
are indistinguishable from all the other natural stayers in that sector.
Therefore, let it be said that our tax scheme targets two groups above
all: L and H. This entails the following:
4. Tax Exemption for group L. Those who are in this group are
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natural gainers from trade. Therefore, even given the subsidy for
job-stayers in sector Y , the agents will find it profitable to switch
their occupations, conditional on the tax-exemption in the new
sector.
5. Tax the group H at the same rate as that used in the post-trade
unanticipated scheme:
t∗∗ant(π(θ
∗)) =
πjX1 − πjY 0 |τ=1
πjX1
=
W · θ∗ −A
W · θ∗ − δ(θ
∗).
Then, everyone except for those who have τ = 1 will surely gain a
positive rent. Thus, this tax rate is incentive-compatible for those
who are in group H. The term δ(θ∗) has the same property as it
did in the previous section.
We can state that the scheme presented here satisfies all three condi-
tions: feasibility, weak Pareto improvement, and being self-financing. It
is feasible, since all the tax and subsidy rates are incentive compatible. It
is weakly Pareto improving, since every agent is at least as happy as he or
she was under autarky. If there exist aggregate gains from trade, the tax
revenues from this scheme will be larger than the costs of subsidy. It is
natural to assume that net government revenues that have been brought
in by the job-staying individuals in both sectors X and Y would be posi-
tive. With respect to the job-switchers, who created a overcompensation
problem in the unanticipated case, this scheme will either tax some of
them or exempt some from tax; hence, the policymaker will be left with
strictly positive tax revenue. Although there exist some positive rents,
and hence overcompensation in the form of smaller taxes for the group H,
this overcompensation will not negatively affect the government budget
since it takes the form of a smaller-than-ideal tax rate.
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Nevertheless, the allocation achieved in this scheme is not without its
costs. The scheme attains three desirable properties — feasibility, weak
Pareto improvement, and being self-financing — creates aggregate-level
inefficiency — namely, the smaller aggregate consumption possibility set,
evaluated at the world-price level. This smaller aggregate-gains arise out
of the fact that there is a smaller number of job-switching individuals.
Proposition 7 There exists an anticipated (ex ante) compensation
program that is feasible, weakly Pareto improving, and self-financ-
ing. The aggregate consumption possibilities set is smaller than the one
under the unanticipated (ex post) case.
Furthermore, when we look at the current TAA program, we find
a striking result. Noting that our model does not have any frictional
costs for occupation-switching, we propose taxing at a positive rate or at
zero (tax exemption) those who switch occupations. This contradicts the
results in Feenstra and Lewis (1994), which suggests a relocation subsidy
for job-switchers. Our optimal scheme suggests that, to the contrary, the
policymaker should give no subsidy to the job-switchers. We propose
that the subsidy be given only to those job-stayers who choose to remain
in the declining industry. Given the way we have set up our model to
have no frictional moving (between-sectors) costs, we are not surprised
to arrive at the following negative result about the current TAA, which
provides a poll subsidy to occupation-switchers.
Proposition 8 The poll subsidy for those who have changed industries
has a disincentive problem. It induces an inefficient allocation of indi-
viduals.
Given the setup of the model in this paper, the minimal subsidy
for the job-switching individuals must be non-positive; i.e., it must con-
tain a tax exemption for group L and a positive tax for group H. By
246
v01
Occupational Choice and Compensation for Losers from International Trade 81
giving a positive subsidy to the job-switching individuals, some of the
job-stayers in sector Y (especially those individual agents who are closer
to the gain-zero line OZ) may find it profitable to move to sector X. And
yet, while this positive subsidy is successful in terms of inducing some
counter-factual job-switchers to actually move to a more efficient sector
(in the post-trade world), it also creates a huge side-effect. Because the
policymaker cannot distinguish the counter-factual job-switchers from
the natural (winning) job-switchers, a positive subsidy creates the over-
compensation problem all over again, for the job-switchers who are on
the same iso current-profit lines. It turns out that the policymaker must
offer the same menu of tax-subsidy rates as that seen in the unantici-
pated post-trade compensation scheme, if the government is to observe
the maximum number of job-switchers, and hence see the maximum ag-
gregate production gains in the economy. With this subsidy, the same
overcompensation problem, and the same ambiguity as to a violation of
the scheme’s self-financing, become problems.
The preceding analysis has shown us, in the case of an anticipated
compensation scheme where the government aims to attain a Pareto im-
provement from autarky, that there exists a tradeoff between size of ag-
gregate production gains from trade and amount of overcompensation.
9. Conclusion
This paper has developed a model that attains aggregate production
gains from trade. The model aims to depict a realistic situation which
individual agents often actually find themselves in. It assumes that an
individual agent must choose one job at a time, and that he is endowed
with a multi-valued vector of talents in various sectors. The productivity
of the agents is assumed to differ across the agents. This setup certainly
creates gainers and losers from trade, but the amount of the gains and
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losses is based on the relative strengths of the agents’ talents, between
their actually-used ones and their unused-latent ones. If the government
chooses to impose a realistic taxation-subsidy scheme on current factor-
prices and profits, then policymakers must face up to an unavoidable
tradeoff between Pareto improvement and overcompensation. In other
words, if the policymakers do attain a Pareto improvement, the com-
pensation scheme will necessarily be overcompensating the job-switching
individuals. If, on the other hand, they rigorously avoid overcompen-
sation because they care about a balanced-budget, their compensation
program will not attain any Pareto improvement.
In addition to this tradeoff, it is the case that when a compensation
scheme is anticipated by the individual agents, there emerges another
tradeoff, this one being between overcompensation and size of aggre-
gate production gains. Most policymakers are vaguely aware of all these
tradeoffs, but there still haven’t been many serious studies done on this
issue. Thus this paper has taken as its appointed task the proposing of
a theoretical framework that can explain the tradeoffs the governments
face when trying to set up compensating redistribution schemes.
This paper also provides its readers with an explanation for the dif-
ficulty we all face in distinguishing winners from losers in the wake of an
opening up to trade. Such identifications have been attempted success-
fully for such a basic trade model as that of Heckscher-Ohlin or specific-
factors model. As for Feenstra and Lewis (1994), they noted their own
difficulty of the identification, in their imperfectly mobile factors model,
and set up as part of their investigation into heterogeneous adjustment
costs. And while Feenstra and Lewis assumed positive adjustment costs
for all of their imperfectly mobile factors, my model has found cases in
which the adjustment costs for some agents among those who switch their
occupations may become negative and hence, there are gainers. Thus,
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the poll subsidy for job-switching individuals (supported as a remedy by
Feenstra and Lewis) may not be a good compensation policy under the
setup of my model. Furthermore, any observation of current profits will
not reflect the actual gains or losses from trade openings. This makes
it highly difficult for any government to put in place a reliably Pareto-
improving compensation scheme that bases the tax-subsidy on current
variables.
This paper has provided its readers with a model of individuals’
occupational-choices and welfare-changes when the economy faces a
change in terms of trade, and especially, one from autarky to free trade.
We have found that there exist both winners and losers among the job-
switchers. And yet, although this paper’s analysis can explain individ-
uals’ long-run gains and losses from moving to a new sector, the model
does not take into account the short-run costs arising out of the labor
adjustment process. (We have implicitly assumed that frictional unem-
ployment costs are zero.) Therefore the paper’s chief theoretical result —
no positive subsidy for job-switching individuals, in a self-financing com-
pensation scheme — should not and must not be taken too literally. In-
deed, the actual government compensation provided by the United States
Department of Labor through its trade adjustment assistance (TAA) pro-
gram involves a relocation subsidy for those who move to a new location
when job-switching owing to trade openings. Such a program may be jus-
tified, to the extent that there exist short-run frictional costs associated
with job-switching.
One of the simplifying assumptions of the paper is that occupa-
tional talents are exogenously given for each individual. In reality, people
may invest much of their time in expanding their skills. I have left out
the possibility of such dynamic development of individual talent via a
human-capital investment. Grossman and Shapiro (1982) looked at the
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determinants of individual talent-training, when the individual agents are
identical ex ante. An interesting extension of this paper’s model would
bring a greater richness to a dynamic formation of specific factors, by
allowing for investment in individual occupational talents. Surely this is
one of the most promising areas for future research.
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A. A Profit Tax System
Let us assume that the production function is
x = X(k, θ), (53)
where x is a quantity of output, k is the amount of generic factor em-
ployed by the firm, and θ is the specific occupational factor that is indi-
visible and embodied in the individual agent. Let X(k, θ) be increasing in
both arguments, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and
with constant returns to scale.
Let p be the output price of x. Let r be the market price for the
generic factor k. The agent’s profit maximization program will then be
written
max
k
π(k, θ; p, r) = p ·X(k, θ)− r · k. (54)
Note that the choice variable for the agent is k only, because θ is embodied
and indivisible. The regular first-order condition is written
∂π
∂k
= 0⇐⇒ p · ∂X
∂k
= r. (55)
Strict concavity of the production function X(·, ·) guarantees that the
second-order condition for the regular problem (54) holds with strict
inequality:
∂2π
∂k2
< 0. (56)
Now, consider the profit-tax system on the profit of the agent, given equa-
tion (54). If the ad valorem tax rate is t, then the profit-maximization
program is written as
max
k
(1− t) {p ·X(k, θ)− r · k} . (57)
When t does not depend on k or θ, the profit-maximization problem faced
by an individual is unchanged. Hence, the first-order condition will be
the same as (55).
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A.1 Tax Rate Proportional to Profit
Now let 1 − t = T (π) be the profit-tax schedule. The rate of tax
depends on the observed profit of the individual. The program is now
written
max
k
{T (π) · π} = T (π) {p ·X(k, θ)− r · k} . (58)
The first-order condition for (58) will be
∂T
∂π
· ∂π
∂k
· π + T · ∂π
∂k
=
∂π
∂k
·
{
∂T
∂π
· π + T
}
= 0. (59)
Condition (59) implies that ∂π∂k = 0, except for the case where
∂T
∂π
· π + T = T
(
1 +
∂T
∂π
· π
T
)
= T (1 + ε) = 0,
with ε ≡ ∂T/T∂π/π being an elasticity of the tax rate with respect to profit.
Thus we find that, unless ε = −1, the first-order condition (59) implies
the same condition as (55).
The second-order condition for the profit-maximization will be
∂2π
∂k2
·
{
∂T
∂π
· π + T
}
+
∂π
∂k
· ∂
∂k
{
∂T
∂π
· π + T
}
≡ SOC < 0. (60)
The second term of SOC will be
∂π
∂k
·
{
∂2T
∂π2
· ∂π
∂k
· π + 2
(
∂T
∂π
· ∂π
∂k
)}
.
This is evaluated around the optimum point, where ∂π∂k = 0. Thus, given
(56), we see that the relevant condition for the program’s second-order
condition will be
∂T
∂π
· π + T = T (1 + ε) > 0.
And since we know that T > 0, the condition also can be shown as
ε =
∂T/T
∂π/π
> −1. (61)
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So, unless the profit-tax rate decreases by more than 1% as the profit
simultaneously increases by 1%, the agent will maximize the profit even
after the tax has been imposed on the profit.
A.2 Tax Rate Proportional to Output
Now let 1− t = T (x) be a new profit-tax schedule. The rate of tax
depends on the observed output of the individual. The program is now
written
max
k
{T (x) · π} = T (x) {p ·X(k, θ)− r · k} . (62)
The first-order condition is now written
∂T
∂x
· ∂X
∂k
· π+T ·
{
p · ∂X
∂k
− r
}
=
∂X
∂k
·
{
∂T
∂x
· π + pT
}
− rT = 0. (63)
Note that the optimal level of k is smaller than the no tax case (54),
because
∂T
∂x
· ∂X
∂k
· {p ·X(k, θ)− r · k} < 0,
together with r > 0 and T > 0 implies that{
p · ∂X
∂k
− r
}
> 0.
Thus, the profit tax system that is based on observed output will in-
evitably be distortionary.
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